42 Melbourne University Law Review [Vol 41(2):Adv It has been well documented in other contexts that the effectiveness of such measures can suffer when the measures are perceived as creating division and discrimination within a population, rather than as genuinely consultative and community-driven.213 Thirdly, the practice of citizenship stripping on disloyalty or security grounds produces further negative effects. An individual who is stripped of citizenship may suffer severe consequences, including isolation from their home and family, the loss of democratic rights, detention and deportation. Additionally, the practice of citizenship stripping has the potential to undermine accountability for actions taken against individuals by states. At least two former British citizens, Mohamed Sakr and Bilal al-Berjawi, have been killed by US by a Counter-Extremism Strategy: Secretary of State for the Home Department, Counter-Extremism Strategy (n 37). In Canada, this is dealt with via the Prevent limb of the government’s counterterrorism strategy: Government of Canada, Building Resilience against Terrorism: Canada’s Counter-Terrorism Strategy (Strategy, 2nd ed, 2013) 15–17 <www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/ rsrcs/pblctns/rslnc-gnst-trrrsm/rslnc-gnst-trrrsm-eng.pdf>, archived at <https://perma.cc/ ZGU5-TQLB>. In Australia, funding for community-based programs to counter violent extremism was first introduced in 2010 by the Rudd government. This was initially discontinued by the Abbott government, but was reintroduced in the 2014 budget: see Cat Barker, ‘Australian Government Measures to Counter Violent Extremism: A Quick Guide’, Parliament of Australia (Web Page, 10 February 2015) <www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_ Departments/Parliamentary_Library/pubs/rp/rp1415/Quick_Guides/Extremism>, archived at <https://perma.cc/JF83-QJX5>. The Attorney-General’s department notes that ‘[s]tate and territory-led intervention programmes [(with Commonwealth financial support)] have been established or are under development across Australia to identify radicalised and at-risk individuals, and provide tailored services to address the root causes of their radicalisation’: ‘CVE Intervention Programmes’, Australian Government: Attorney-General’s Department (Web Page) <www.ag.gov.au/NationalSecurity/Counteringviolentextremism/Pages/Interventionprogrammes.aspx>, archived at <https://perma.cc/A3MJ-6DYV>. 213 This has been a significant problem with the UK’s Prevent strategy for counter-radicalisation. The coupling of community development measures focused predominantly on Muslim communities, with a counterterrorism agenda and surveillance practices, has produced a community perception that Prevent’s community development goal is a ‘pretext for [government] “spying” on potential terrorists’: Keiran Hardy, ‘Resilience in UK Counter-Terrorism’ (2015) 19 Theoretical Criminology 77, 87 (citations omitted). See also Arun Kundnani, Spooked! How Not to Prevent Violent Extremism (Report, Institute of Race Relations, October 2009). In February 2016, the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation ‘sent a supplementary submission to the Home Affairs Select Committee in respect of its inquiry into countering extremism’, in which he argued that Prevent could benefit from independent review because it was ‘clearly suffering from a widespread problem of perception, particularly in relation to the statutory duty on schools and in relation to non-violent extremism’: Joint Committee on Human Rights, Counter-Extremism (House of Lords Paper No 39, House of Commons Paper No 105, Session 2016–17) 13 [36], quoting David Anderson, Supplementary Written Evidence to the Home Affairs Select Committee, Inquiry into Countering Extremism (29 January 2016) 2 [7]. Advance Copy