Children at Risk of Statelessness in the Fight against Terrorism justifications, in the interests of national security, are questionable, according to a growing body of political and sociological scholarship.22 The first part of the paper explores citizenship stripping as a counter-terrorism measure in Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Germany, France, the Netherlands and the UK. Next, it compares the application of the legal frameworks of citizenship deprivation in these countries, before discussing why security-based citizenship stripping does not have the desired effect of combatting terrorism but, on the contrary, increases the risk of radicalisation by escalating drivers and also risks exporting security threats to other countries. The second part demonstrates the impact of citizenship revocation on the children of FTFs. It outlines the various ways children themselves might end up stateless due to this policy and how this negatively impacts their wellbeing. It includes the brief presentation of two case studies. The subsequent analysis of international obligations to protect children’s rights and to avoid statelessness will show how the current practice might be in contradiction with international human rights law. The paper concludes that citizenship stripping of FTFs for security reasons has limited relevance but, on the contrary, violates the prohibition of arbitrary citizenship deprivation, the principles of the best interest of the child and of non-discrimination and unnecessarily risks statelessness for children born in conflict zones. CITIZENSHIP STRIPPING AS A COUNTER-TERRORISM MEASURE A National Laws on Deprivation of Citizenship Many countries around the world, particularly states in Europe, have enacted legislation on citizenship deprivation as a counter-terrorism measure in recent years. While the concept of citizenship stripping per se is not new, expanding the legislation and increasingly denaturalising nationals who join terrorist groups abroad is an emerging phenomenon of the last 10 years.23 This major trend started in 2014, when the high numbers of FTFs participating in the prolonged Syrian conflict became a concern for many countries.24 22 23 24 See, eg, Marc Sageman, ‘On Recidivism: A Commentary on Altier, Boyle, and Horgan’ (2021) 33(4) Terrorism and Political Violence 861; Omi Hodwitz, ‘The Terrorism Recidivism Study (TRS): An Update on Data Collection and Results’ (2021) 15(4) Perspectives on Terrorism 27. On the alleged dangers of FTF-associated women see Antonia Ward, ‘It’s Complicated: Not All Returning “Jihadi Brides” Are Dangerous’, The National Interest (online, 28 February 2018) <https://nationalinterest.org/feature/its-complicated-not-allreturning-jihadi-brides-are-24677?nopaging=1>. For example, the UK did not use its citizenship stripping powers even once between 1974 and February 2002: SSHD, Secure Borders, Safe Haven: Integration with Diversity in Modern Britain (Report No Cm 5387, February 2002) 35 <https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/ government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/250926/cm5387.pdf>. Only at the end of 2012 did Belgium introduce art 23(1) in the Code of Belgian Nationality, allowing the deprivation of citizenship if the person was sentenced to at least five years of imprisonment for a terrorist crime: see Loi modifiant le Code de la nationalité belge afin de rendre l’acquisition de la nationalité belge neutre du point de vue de l’immigration [Law amending the Code of Belgian Nationality] (2012) 393 Moniteur Belge/Belgisch Staatsblad [Official Gazette of Belgium] 79998, art 20. In January 2015, it was estimated that nearly 4,000 Europeans had joined armed groups in Syria and Iraq and that, overall, the conflict had attracted 20,730 foreign fighters worldwide: see Peter Neumann, ‘Foreign Fighter Total in Syria/Iraq Now Exceeds 20,000; Surpasses Afghanistan Conflict in the 1980s’, ICSR (Web Page, 26 January 2015) <https://icsr.info/2015/01/26/foreign-fighter-total-syriairaq-now-exceeds-20000-surpassesafghanistan-conflict-1980s/>. 37