8 Lucia M. Rafanelli presents the relationship between statelessness and state power in order to challenge the statist ideal.42 Statelessness as a product of the state system Despite the central role the idea of statelessness plays in the theories surveyed above, none of them gives us sufficient resources to understand statelessness as it manifests in the world today or the ethical issues that come along with it. Perhaps this is unsurprising, as the theories surveyed above arguably concern the foundations of state power, and therefore discuss the kind of statelessness that arises before stable states are established—rather than the statelessness that arises once states are already in place.43 There is nothing wrong with this on its own. The problem arises when this understanding of statelessness—applicable, perhaps, in the moment of state formation and in the absence of an entrenched state system—is invoked to justify normative claims about the obligations individuals have to already-established states in an already-entrenched state system. The theorists surveyed above (especially Kant, Stilz, and Wellman) do not present their theories as generating normative conclusions only for people involved in the process of state formation in the absence of an entrenched state system. They present their theories as giving much more generally applicable reasons and justifying much more generally applicable obligations to obey and uphold state power. Thus, I do not claim that the theorists surveyed above would say modern statelessness is the same phenomenon as the ‘statelessness’ of the state of nature. Rather, I want to highlight a rhetorical move commonly made in political theory: to invoke one image of the absence of state protection (the statelessness of the state of nature) and draw on it to justify the claim that people here and now have obligations to maintain and obey states—even though the way in which people today experience the absence of state protection (modern statelessness) is a distinct phenomenon that the state system itself creates. If, when you envision the absence of state protection, you see a void where state power should be (as in the classic images of the state of nature), you will look for state power to fill it. But if, when you envision the absence of state protection, you see a creature of the state system (as I argue we should understand modern statelessness), you will look for ways to dismantle that system. Rather than understanding statelessness as the mere absence of a state, then, I propose we see statelessness—and the continued vulnerability to it—as a product of the state system. Recall, by ‘statelessness’ I mean the condition of effectively lacking 42 My critique of the statist ideal shares some similarities to Ochoa Espejo’s (2020) critique of the ‘Desert Island Model,’ which presents states with sovereign jurisdiction over set territories and discretionary powers to control resources and borders in their territories as the ideal governing institutions. However, Ochoa Espejo’s view is part of a larger account of territorial rights that attempts to explain the foundations of rights to jurisdiction, natural resource use, and border control partly by developing a theory of ‘place-based’ duties. While my view is compatible with many of Ochoa Espejo’s positions on these issues, it does not depend on endorsing them. Correspondingly, Ochoa Espejo focuses more on developing a general theory of territorial rights and political community. In contrast, I focus on identifying a particular shortcoming of the existing state system (its organization around the Political Authority and Sovereignty Principles) and its implications for the ethics of resistance—defending positions adherents of many different theories of territorial rights and political community could potentially endorse. 43 My thanks to Inés Valdez for suggesting this interpretation. https://doi.org/10.1017/S175297192500003X Published online by Cambridge University Press