International Theory 23 Insofar as the source of injustice is the structure of the state system itself— specifically, its organisation around the Political Authority and Sovereignty Principles—rather than any one state’s behaviour or migration policy, the injustice cannot be remedied by making reforms that leave the background structure intact. This idea is also reflected in some resistance movements led by stateless people. Focusing on asylum-seeker-led protest movements in Germany and Austria, Saunders argues that the asylum seekers do not only demand asylum, but also critique the international human rights and refugee policy regimes and more generally the ‘political and socioeconomic structures of global life’ that effectively keep them in positions of vulnerability.105 Saunders argues that only some of protesters’ demands can be accommodated by the human rights and refugee policy regimes currently dominant on the international stage.106 Other demands challenge these regimes’ fundamental underlying principles, especially the idea that one’s home state is and should be the primary guarantor of one’s human rights.107 That is, they challenge the Political Authority Principle, which attaches human rights protections to state membership. The second problem with the accommodationist objection arises because a fully just world would not only guarantee remedies for the specific people who are currently stateless, but would also be structured to guard against others experiencing statelessness going forward. This—insurance against the production and reproduction of a class of stateless people—would require radical departures from the state system as we know it. Specifically, it would require abandoning at least one of the Political Authority or Sovereignty Principles. This is because, as argued in previous sections, as long as the state system is organised around these principles, people will always be vulnerable to statelessness. Insofar as the state system attaches basic needs fulfilment, rights protections, and enfranchisement to state membership (the Political Authority Principle) and grants states the discretion to deny membership at will (the Sovereignty Principle), it sets things up so that new groups of people will predictably be made stateless and suffer the corresponding deprivations as time goes on. This would be true even if every currently stateless person were offered remedies for the deprivations they had suffered up to this point. Thus, challenging the organising principles of the state system—accomplished by resisting the statist institutions that uphold it—seems integral to achieving genuine justice, as opposed to merely improving the conditions of the state system’s latest victims. A modified version of the accommodationist objection acknowledges that it would be insufficient to incorporate stateless people into the state system as it is currently constituted, but argues that full justice could be achieved by incorporating them into a reformed version of the state system that was nonetheless still state-centric. One might imagine, for example, layering international or cosmopolitan institutions or inter-state agreements on top of existing statist institutions without challenging the underlying structure of the state system. Stilz endorses such a view in her later work, where she offers ‘a qualified defence of a territorial states system’.108 (I will treat Stilz’s view as emblematic of the modified accommodationist objection.) Stilz argues that the state system cannot be fully legitimate unless it is made to align more thoroughly with the values underlying its justification (occupancy rights, basic justice, and 105 Saunders 2018, 848. Ibid., 854. 107 Ibid. 108 Stilz 2019, 249. 106 https://doi.org/10.1017/S175297192500003X Published online by Cambridge University Press