International Theory 19 authority to grant or deny citizenship.90 And, in her work on asylum seeker-led protests in Germany and Austria, Saunders notes how they can create new avenues for political contestation that may not rely on states, establish asylum seekers as clear political agents, and challenge dominant understandings of politics, citizenship, and community.91 In these cases, too, refugees challenge the Political Authority Principle by asserting their political agency outside official state-sanctioned channels and despite lacking state membership—and challenge the Sovereignty Principle by asserting and enacting forms of political community and membership that do not depend upon states’ discretionary approval. This turn to resistance to achieve political goals the state system makes appear beyond the reach of stateless people is significant because it suggests another avenue —besides working within the confines of statist norms and institutions—by which stateless people can secure justice. Again, if the state system (specifically, the combination of the Political Authority and Sovereignty Principles) creates statelessness and working within the confines of statist norms and institutions entrenches and reproduces the state system, then contesting those norms and institutions may be a more productive way for stateless people to overcome the obstacles to flourishing the state system puts in their way. Moreover, one core injustice associated with statelessness is that stateless people are denied not only various goods and protections, but also the political agency necessary to remedy these deprivations. This creates a kind of democratic deficit, in that stateless people are subject to the myriad political institutions comprising the current state system, but are effectively denied a say in those institutions. Stateless people asserting their political agency as against the state system that denies it is arguably an important part of opposing this injustice. Seen this way, such resistance against the terms imposed by the current state system may even be a prerequisite for a just, democratic world order. Implications for the ethics of anti-statist resistance Elsewhere, I have argued that there is a natural duty of justice requiring everyone to do their fair share to help ensure others live under just conditions, and that this duty requires people to help achieve justice for others everywhere, not only their co-citizens.92 Even those who don’t endorse the natural duty of justice may think people have differently grounded obligations to pursue justice. If this is true, and if resisting statist institutions is a prerequisite to achieving a fully just and democratic world, are stateless people morally obligated to resist? In general, I think not, because resisting statist institutions may be very costly for them. It may involve antagonising the very actors who control the material conditions in which they live and confronting wellresourced and well-armed opponents who may vehemently, and violently, defend the statist status quo. And, recall, the natural duty of justice only requires people to pursue justice when this is not prohibitively costly for them—to use my formulation, when it does not disrupt what they take to be their central life projects.93 Other 90 Ilcan 2018. Saunders 2018, 850–2, 864. 92 Rafanelli 2021, 22–7. 93 See ibid., 25. 91 https://doi.org/10.1017/S175297192500003X Published online by Cambridge University Press