International Theory 13 institutions alternative for being insufficiently democratic because its centres of power would be so far removed from the average world citizen. Arguably, we could avoid this by instead instituting a pluralistic world order where power was shared among state, non-state, and sub-state groups. But this might introduce the problem of ‘forum shopping’, whereby, in a world of overlapping jurisdictions, alreadypowerful and well-resourced actors would be the best equipped to bring their claims to whatever institutions would treat them most favourably—at others’ expense. How should we evaluate and weigh these risks? Are any of the proposed alternatives more feasible than others, and should this change our assessment of their moral worth? Doing these issues justice would require a lengthier treatment than I can give here. Thus, I offer the alternatives above only as possible suggestions to illustrate some ways we could address the core problem I identify in this article—the organisation of the state system around the Political Authority and Sovereignty Principles—so as to address the core injustice it creates—statelessness. Recognising these alternatives—even without identifying the ‘best’ one—also highlights that continuing to organise our political lives around and within a state system based on the Political Authority and Sovereignty Principles is a choice. It is a choice to adopt norms and policies that create, as a matter of course, a class of people denied enfranchisement, needs fulfilment, and rights protection because they are denied state membership. One might object that presenting statelessness as a product of the state system obscures the many different reasons particular people become stateless—including persecution, climate change, and inadequate record-keeping that leaves people unable to legally establish their nationalities.63 I agree, the most direct cause of someone being without an effective state membership varies from case to case. But the fact that this person is, as a result, denied stable access to basic needs fulfilment, rights protections, and political enfranchisement (because the Political Authority Principle attaches these benefits to state membership) and the fact that they are not guaranteed membership in a new state that could grant them these benefits (because the Sovereignty Principle grants states the discretion to deny newcomers membership at will) are products of the state system. Moreover, that new people can always be made similarly vulnerable—that new classes of stateless people can always be generated, whatever the direct causes of their statelessness may be—is also a product of the state system. Statist institutions maintain the state system One way the state system maintains its current structure—thereby creating and re-creating the problems of statelessness—is by channelling political activity into statist institutions. This reinforces the impression that states should be the primary loci of political power and helps ensure states remain the primary loci of political power (in line with the Political Authority Principle). To illustrate this dynamic, I look to Hong Kong’s treatment of asylum seekers.64 I do not claim the Hong Kong 63 Thank you to Marty Finnemore and Anum Syed for raising this concern. Hong Kong’s sovereign status is complex. However, I will treat Hong Kong’s institutions as statist institutions. One could argue that Hong Kong is functionally a state, so we should theorise it as such. Or one could argue that we should see it as a subsidiary of the Chinese state. While I will typically adopt the former perspective, either option suggests Hong Kong’s governing institutions are part of and consonant with the basic organising structure of the state system—and this is what is relevant for my present arguments. 64 https://doi.org/10.1017/S175297192500003X Published online by Cambridge University Press