include a qualifier on the phrase “for any reason”. Adding restrictive language such as “beyond the control” is not in line with the plain meaning of the treaty. In accordance with the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, the Convention should be interpreted “in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.”125 If the plain language of the Convention were followed, Palestinian refugees whose protection ceased “for any reason” would be able to apply for refugee status in countries that are signatories to the 1951 Convention, and it should be granted automatically. This would comply with the object and purpose of the Convention to ensure continuing protection for Palestinian refugees and would be in line with the UN recognition that Palestinians are already refugees. The observation in El Kott and XT that interpreting Article 1D to permit inclusion in cases of “mere absence” or “voluntary departure” from UNRWA’s area of operation would mean the exclusion clause would have no practical effect is incorrect. The Court in XT cites the fact that neither Article 1D nor its parallel EU Directive refer to a specific place of residence as being relevant, only whether UNRWA assistance has ceased.126 However, even if an applicant who departed completely voluntarily from UNRWA’s area of operation is included under Article 1D, the exclusion clause would still have the very significant practical effect of continuing to exclude any Palestinians registered with UNRWA or accessing its services who are still in UNRWA’s area of operation (unless there is acknowledgement that the UNCCP’s inability to fulfil its protection mandate triggered the inclusion clause on a broad scale). This would likely continue to affect millions of Palestinians who remained within UNRWA’s area of operation. Governments and courts have generally applied the El Kott judgment by interpreting “for any reason” to mean departure from UNRWA’s area of operation for a reason beyond the applicant’s control and independent of their volition. UNHCR interprets the CJEU’s approach in El Kott and XT as an assessment of whether protection or assistance has ceased against objective factors for leaving the UNRWA area of operations that is “equally applicable in circumstances whereby the person is prevented from (re)availing [themselves] of UNRWA’s protection or assistance”,127 meaning that a Palestinian who departed voluntarily from UNRWA’s area of operations and later is unable to return for reasons beyond their control may fall within the scope of the inclusion clause. It would be helpful if the CJEU and other courts were to clearly confirm that Palestinians who depart voluntarily from UNRWA’s area of operation can be included under Article 1D, and UNRWA assistance deemed to have ceased, because they are no longer present in UNRWA’s area of operations. The holdings in Serin Alheto that Article 1D must be considered prior to Article 1A of the 1951 Convention and that registration with UNRWA does not necessarily mean that the applicant could access sufficient protection in UNRWA’s area of operation are helpful and appropriate. The approach in Serin Alheto and XT that the relevant area of consideration for potential return is the entirety of UNRWA’s area of operation is flawed in its apparent assumption that Palestinian refugees are likely to have the ability to enter and have permission to reside in more than one UNRWA field of operations. This decision creates additional and unnecessary evidentiary challenges for applicants who are already refugees. It should instead be assumed that Palestinians only have permission to reside in the UNRWA field in which they previously lived (and sometimes not even there). Palestinian refugees should not have the burden to 125 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (adopted 23 May 1969, entered into force 27 January 1980) 1155 UNTS 331, art 31. See also Bianchini, 88-93, n 35, discussing the correct interpretation of Article 1D of the 1951 Convention and Article 1(2) (i) of the 1954 Convention in accordance with the VCLT 126 See El Kott, Paras 49-50; and XT, Paras 70-71. 127 See El Kott, Paras 49-51; XT, Paras 69-71; and UNHCR, Statement on the Interpretation and Application of Article 1D of the 1951 Convention and Article 12(1)(a) of the EU Qualification Directive Issued in the context of the preliminary ruling reference to the Court of Justice of the European Union from the Bundesverwaltungsgericht (Germany) lodged on 3 July 2019 – Federal Republic of Germany v XT (C-507/19) (18 Aug 2020), Para 18, https://www.refworld.org/docid/5f3bdd234.html. See also UNHCR, Additional Submission of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees in CASE C-349/20 NB & AB v Secretary of State for the Home Department before the Court of Justice of the European Union (21 June 2021) https://www. refworld.org/docid/60d5ecfa4.html; and UNHCR, Written observations of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees in case C-349/20 NB & AB v Secretary of State for the Home Department before the Court of Justice of the European Union (30 Nov 2020) https://www.refworld.org/docid/5fc8a22c4.html. 22