territory. Since 1967, more than 2,500 military orders have been issued in the West Bank and Gaza,38 effectively denying Palestinian self-determination in the occupied territory while fermenting de facto Israeli sovereignty. This systematic implementation of military orders and policies has severely limited or completely denied Palestinians the ability to use natural resources and access services for the realization of their fundamental human rights, including self-determination. This ongoing denial has effectively forced the occupied Palestinian population and the economy to be dependent on Israel. And this dependency has not only continued into the era following the Oslo Accords, but has intensified alarmingly. The Impact of the Oslo Accords The 1995 Oslo II Accord divided the West Bank and Gaza into three areas; A, B, and C, with different security and administrative arrangements and authorities.39 Along with its establishment, the Palestinian Authority (PA) was to assume full control over civil and internal security matters of Area A, which constitutes only 18 percent of the West Bank, and civil matters of Area B, accounting for 22 percent. Area C, comprising over 60 percent of the West Bank, remained under full control of the Israeli military for both security and civilian affairs, including land administration and planning. East Jerusalem was not classified as Area A, B or C under the Oslo Accords and its status was postponed to final status negotiations.40 Following the singing of the Oslo Accords, there has been some contention as to whether or not IHL continued to apply to all of the oPt as the PA did have some degree of autonomy over Areas A and B. However, this can be subjected to the test of ‘effective control’ to ascertain whether a territory is occupied within the meaning of IHL. Legal analysis has affirmed that: “only when, and where, the occupying power has attained unquestioned control does hostile territory become subject to the legal restraints of the law of occupation.”41 Therefore, occupation is not contingent per se on military presence, but rather to the extent that the Occupying Power exerts effective 38 Note that military orders are no longer applicable in the Gaza Strip; up until the Israeli withdrawal from Gaza in 2005, there were over 1400 military regulations governing Gaza. See, Addameer Prisoner Support and Human Rights Association [hereinafter Addameer], The Israeli Military System, September 2008, available at: http://www.addameer.org/publications/israeli-military-system 39 Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (Oslo II), 28 September 1995, available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/3de5ebbc0.html [hereinafter Oslo II] 40 Ibid. 41 Ibid.; Harvard Program on Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research International Humanitarian Law Research Initiative, Legal Aspects of Israel’s Disengagement Plan under International Humanitarian Law, Policy Brief, November 2004, 6, available at: http://www.hamoked.org/items/7820_eng.pdf 17