The Transnational Human Rights Review, Vol. 8, Iss. 1 [2021], Art. 1 exclusive, and the former as lying within the sovereign domain. 79 The existing literature lacks in presuming that stateless individuals are vulnerable and in extreme instances could be exposed to persecution through “othering”. What it fails to consider is that statelessness itself could be a result of persecution - the “final persecutory act”.80 For instance, the UNHCR handbook on Statelessness recommends states to carry out nationality campaigns and verification procedures,81 without considering that states that have willingly divested individuals of their nationality are unlikely to bring them back into the body politic. David Owen concedes that political dynamics could lead to an en masse deprivation of nationality, as in the case of the Rohingyas (overt exclusion of Rohingyas from recognized ‘ethnic groups’ conferred citizenship under the 1982 Act), or the European Romas (through discriminatory practices during processing of documents).82 He notes how States use both overt and covert practices in depriving individuals of nationality by creating difficulties for certain communities as in the case of African countries, or through stringent interpretations of laws as in the case of Malaysia. In another instance in the Dominican Republic, the State excluded those of Haitian descent by initially refusing to confer birth certificates and later asking them to produce the same certificates – thereby retroactively stripping their citizenship. But in 2010 and 2011, the US Federal Court passed two decisions, which according to Professor Fullerton,83 allowed for at least raising a presumption of persecution in cases where the state withdrew an individual’s nationality. Thus, in Haile v. Holder,84 an Ethiopian citizen of Eritrean origin was deprived of his nationality, in the context of ethnic hostilities following Eritrea's independence.85 Despite any additional evidence of his ever being harassed, arrested or targeted,86 the Appeals Court held that the immigration authorities’ decision denying persecution was unsustainable. While it did not adjudge the merits of the Appellant’s claim, it observed that 79 Helene Lambert & Michelle Foster, International Refugee Law and the Protection of Stateless Persons (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019), ch 5 at 146. Note that they approach the issue from the lens of failure of the host states in granting refugee status. 80 Ibid at 146-147. 81 See, Inter‑Parliamentary Union with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, “Nationality and Statelessness, Handbook for Parliamentarians No. 22” ( July 2014) at 20, online (pdf): < https://www.refworld.org/docid/53d0a0974.html> 82 Owen, supra note 32 at 303-308. 83 See, Fullerton, supra note 41. 84 591 F.3d 572 (7th Cir. 2010) 85 Ibid at 573-75. 86 Ibid at 495. https://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/thr/vol8/iss1/1 DOI: 10.60082/2563-4631.1096 14