2020 Statelessness & Citizenship Review 2(1) In an attempt to move from the hypothetical to exploring avenues for transferring these ideas into practice, Part IV provides an assessment of the potential for implementation of the hypothesised model of EU citizenship. In this context, both possibilities and limitations are highlighted. Emphasis is placed on matters such as the disentanglement of Member State nationality and EU citizenship and the competence of the EU. Having regard to the foregoing, the conclusion that derives from the analysis is posed in Part V. CONCEPTS AND DEFINITIONS: STATELESSNESS, NATIONALITY AND CITIZENSHIP It must be noted from the outset that statelessness has a variety of causes and can occur in a range of situations, meaning that hardly any two cases of statelessness are entirely comparable. Nevertheless, there is a common denominator across all cases: the lack of a nationality. A ‘stateless person’ is defined in art 1(1) of the 1954 Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons (‘1954 Convention’) as ‘a person who is not considered a national by any State under the operation of its law’. 7 Based upon this characterisation of a stateless person, the term ‘statelessness’ can be understood to refer to the lack of a ‘nationality’. An understanding of what the latter denotes becomes, then, essential to comprehend what the former encompasses. Unfortunately, a certain level of ambiguity and uncertainty exists in this regard, as definitive guidance on the meaning of ‘nationality’ remains absent from international law. In both legal scholarship and legal provisions on these matters, ‘nationality’ is regularly used interchangeably with ‘citizenship’, suggesting that the two terms denote one and the same thing. 8 However, a considerable amount of literature, inspired by questions of belonging that developments such as increased globalisation and ‘Brexit’ raise, has explored and argued for the distinction between the two concepts so as to accommodate transboundary possibilities for belonging. 9 In aiming to illustrate the possible added value EU citizenship might have for stateless persons, this article follows suit in this trend. Nationality, in this contribution, is taken to refer to a legal bond between an individual and a state ‘having as its basis a social fact of attachment, a genuine connection of existence, interests and sentiments’. 10 The possession of a nationality signifies membership of a state, indicating that a person is under the 7 8 9 10 Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons, opened for signature 28 September 1954, 360 UNTS 117 (entered into force 6 June 1960) art 1(1). See, eg, Alice Edwards, ‘The Meaning of Nationality in International Law in an Era of Human Rights: Procedural and Substantive Aspects’ in Alice Edwards and Laura van Waas (eds), Nationality and Statelessness under International Law (Cambridge University Press 2014) 14. Alternatively, they may be viewed as two sides of the same coin, with nationality denoting an external dimension and citizenship an internal dimension: see, eg, Paul Weis, Nationality and Statelessness in International Law (2nd edn, Sijthoff and Noordhoff 1979) 4–5. Kim Rubenstein and Daniel Adler, ‘International Citizenship: The Future of Nationality in a Globalized World’ (2000) 7(2) Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 519; Jonathan Fox, ‘Unpacking “Transnational Citizenship”’ (2005) 8(1) Annual Review of Political Science 171; Dora Kostakopoulou, ‘Scala Civium: Citizenship Templates Post-Brexit and the European Union’s Duty to Protect EU Citizens’ (2018) 56(4) Journal of Common Market Studies 854. Nottebohm Case (Liechtenstein v Guatemala) (Second Phase) (Judgment) [1955] ICJ Rep 4, 23 (‘Nottebohm’). Note that only part of the definition as posed by the International Court of Justice is employed here, leaving out the notion that the legal bond exists ‘together with … reciprocal rights and duties’. This is expanded upon further on in the paragraphs on ‘citizenship’ below. 26