2020 Statelessness & Citizenship Review 2(1) Employment of stateless persons as a result of being granted EU citizenship is also capable of facilitating the naturalisation process. For instance, sufficient knowledge of the national language is often posed as a requirement to naturalise, but might bring associated costs with it to receive training or to take a language test. 80 Naturally, unemployed (stateless) persons might struggle to gather the funds and therefore be unable to acquire a nationality. Earning a wage would work towards solving this problem. What the above intends to illustrate is that EU citizenship, hypothetically, is capable of not only mitigating the practical problems encountered by stateless individuals, but also of indirectly helping them attain the ‘genuine connection’ with a Member State that is necessary to eventually acquire nationality and hence national citizenship. Based on the above analysis, it appears that the EU — through the grant of EU citizenship to stateless persons — can contribute to the facilitation of their naturalisation in their state of residence. This facilitation of naturalisation does not necessarily infringe upon the Member States’ competences and sovereign prerogative to regulate nationality matters. While the hypothetical scenario envisages EU competences necessary to regulate the conditions for acquisition of EU citizenship, the EU must be cognizant and respectful of the competences of the Member States in doing so. Competence encroachment can be avoided in this instance, because, although the possession of EU citizenship could significantly expedite the process of nationality acquisition, the determination of what constitutes a ‘genuine link’ and what requirements are to be met to obtain nationality would remain with the Member States. After all, the EU would not demand the Member States alter their rules regarding nationality acquisition or ease their requirements. As such, a stateless person might be granted EU citizenship and, for instance, acquire a residence permit, but if that person does not meet the requirements set by the Member State, they will be unable to acquire its nationality. It must be clear that EU citizenship in such a context would not serve as a replacement of national citizenship or nationality, but rather provides a gateway for stateless persons to acquire nationality of one of the Member States through channels that are generally available for anyone, such as naturalisation. As the above has demonstrated, citizenship of the EU has the potential of significantly alleviating several of the rights-related challenges and additional hardships experienced by stateless persons. This analysis, however, relied upon the assumption that the ratione personae of EU citizenship was expanded to include a range of other beneficiaries, most notable of which are stateless individuals. The value of EU citizenship in this context therefore derives not so much from what it currently embodies, but rather from what it could be. It appears that the institution of EU citizenship could be more inclusive, more respectful of human rights, and thereby more considerate of the individual. If the aim of the EU is to truly place the ‘individual at the heart of its activities’, and EU citizenship is envisaged as the means of doing so, a reconsideration of the nature of the institution as it currently stands appears to be in place. 80 Asaf Levanon and Noah Lewin-Epstein, ‘Grounds for Citizenship: Public Attitudes in Comparative Perspective’ (2010) 39(3) Social Science Research 419; Harald Bauder, ‘Domicile Citizenship, Human Mobility and Territoriality’ (2014) 38(1) Progress in Human Geography 91. 38