Bangladesh, Burma and the Rohingya crisis 27 increase substantially the funding it gives to CBOs within Burma. Capacitybuilding and training of such groups is a crucial complementary strategy if funding is to be used effectively. Funding CBOs provides donors with the means to support human rights and democracy work within Burma.79 Equally, the Committee recommended: “We recommend that DFID begin appropriate funding of exile groups who carry out crucial work both inside and outside Burma to support IDPs and other vulnerable groups. Support to such groups would have the simultaneous benefit of supporting and raising awareness about the plight of IDPs.”80 51. In 2010 DFID reported: About 20% of our long-term funding for Burma is allocated to communities affected by conflict. These include more than 140,000 Burmese refugees in Thailand, 500,000 internally displaced people (IDPs) in Burma, and two million people living in ethnic cease-fire areas in Burma. Our aid provides food, shelter and access to legal assistance for refugees in Thailand. It also helps to provide IDPs in Burma with food, improved water and sanitation, primary health care and education services, all delivered by communitybased organisations from both Burma and Thailand.81 DFID’s support for civil society brings together local groups to work more effectively on issues of particular importance to ordinary Burmese people. Our programmes have contributed to a growth in humanitarian activities by independent local NGOs. They aim to assist people to participate better in decision-making processes affecting their welfare and livelihoods. 52. The Kachin Relief Fund has been critical of DFID’s use of the larger INGO contractors in the country. It highlights: 79 80 81 • each of these foreign firms have minimal ‘development’ experience. DFID has selected them because of their accounting/compliance systems. • they are all expensive, and often they are adding yet another layer to the aid bureaucracy. How much more of DFID’s funding for Burma will now end up in the pockets of (mainly UK or ‘global-based) companies and consultants? • civil society interests and support will fall further down the list of priorities now that the funds are being managed by commercial operators. • DFID’s accountability to the people of Burma is becoming even more difficult and vague. The donor now has these firms and contracts to hide behind. The governance of these firms is all based 000’s of kilometres away and is focused on what is best for the company. DFID assistance to Burmese internally displaced people and refugees on the Thai-Burma border, Tenth Report, 2006–07, HC 645 DFID assistance to Burmese internally displaced people and refugees on the Thai-Burma border, Tenth Report, 2006–07, HC 645 DFID, UKAID in Burma, 2010