Twan Mrat Naing stated in media interviews that AA acknowledges citizenship rights and basic human rights for Rohingya.34 But many Rohingyas have expressed concern that this may be empty rhetoric designed to address international concerns about their intentions for Rohingya populations. In the same interview, he noted that the Rakhine community do not accept the identity of Rohingya and find the term ‘Rohingya’ offensive. Rohingyas have always been clear, as survivors of group persecution, that citizenship restitution in Myanmar must include acceptance and recognition of their ethnic identity as a group belonging to Rakhine State. This extra layer of administrative burdens and associated costs, together with the re-assertion of movement restrictions that limit income earning opportunities, make the situation for Rohingya household increasingly precarious. In addition, many feel deeply concerned about their long-term safety and security in their homelands. These insecurities and immobilities drive outwardmigration. As one woman living in Bhasan Char camp in Bangladesh explained: In our village, Rohingya feel insecure, and they told us not to return. They told me they even prepared to leave the Rakhine state at any time. Rohingya are facing movement restrictions and threats because of ULA-AA or from the military. An additional established function of a State is to control freedom of movement in and out of their territories.35 Many participants in this research explained that whilst some of the routes out of Rakhine State and Myanmar are still controlled by SAC, most of the routes particularly those across land through other parts of Myanmar are now controlled by ULA-AA. Some reported that brokers needed to pay both AA and SAC officials to get out of Myanmar. Interview participants reported that AA has been cooperative in facilitating outward travel. The control of territory and population of Rakhine by ULA-AA as an unrecognised state body has further implications regarding the right of return for Rohingyas. Organised repatriation for almost one million Rohingyas in refugee camps in Bangladesh is contingent on the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between Bangladesh and Myanmar.36 Whilst the agreement is based on arrangement between the SAC regime and the Government of Bangladesh, it remains impossible for them to implement the repatriations without the involvement of ULA-AA. Further it is currently impossible to ensure a situation of safety and security conducive to voluntary and sustainable repatriations. 3. THE GENDERED DRIVERS OF FORCED MIGRATION Journeys out of Rakhine and Bangladesh towards Southeast Asia have proved dangerous over the years. After the 2012 violence, many Rohingya and others took to the seas in boats to make the journey. Many lives were lost at sea as boats ran out of fuel, food and fresh water.37 Pushbacks from Thailand, and sometimes Malaysia and Indonesia, left people adrift without being allowed to disembark.38 Whilst before 2012, the vast majority of Rohingyas making the journey were men and boys, since then, an increasing number of women and girls have also made the journey.39 As the seas were increasingly monitored, routes over land across Myanmar were also used. These came with their own risks. Interviewees explained that these journeys were made despite many families being fully aware of the risks of arrest, sexual violence and extortion, as well as risks to health and life. Structural factors in Rakhine state continued to drive women and girls to make dangerous journeys. This section highlights some of the key factors that have driven migration for women and girls since the 2021 coup. It will show how Rohingya and other Muslim women and girls, embark on dangerous journey abroad in hope of 8 work, marriage and family reunion, despite knowing the risks involved. The factors that impact household and individual decisions to make these unsafe journeys in post-coup Rakhine include: Household poverty and food insecurities due to conflict and power struggles between SAC and AA as well restrictions on movement and humanitarian aid delivery, and the rising costs of living. • • • • Lack of access for women to education and decent work. Lack of safety and security for women in Rakhine combined with a lack of recourse to support services and legal remedies for cases of sexual and genderbased violence. Lack of legal status and safe or regular migration options for Rohingya and other Muslim women, and Lack of status and decision-making powers within the household.