Rohingyas in India.9 In 2017, military “clearance operations” quickly turned into a campaign of brutal violence, driving more than three quarters of a million Rohingyas from their homes in Rakhine State into Bangladesh. The scale and nature of the abuses, violence, destruction and killings by the military during this period is now widely characterised as ‘genocidal’.10 Since that time, conditions conducive to safe, sustainable and voluntary returns to Myanmar have not been established and the vast majority of Rohingya remain in Bangladesh, unable to return to their homelands. Pervasive insecurities, movement restrictions, restrictions on access to education and training, and a lack of livelihood and income earning opportunities in the camps of Bangladesh compound the long-term problems for Rohingyas, who are unable to secure decent and dignified futures for themselves or their family members.11 In these situations, many Rohingyas take financial and other risks to send family members further afield to seek better futures for themselves as well as to support family members in the camps of Bangladesh and in Rakhine State through finding work and sending remittances.12 There are now over a million Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh and hundreds of thousands of Rohingya throughout Southeast Asia, South Asia and the Middle East, as well as further afield.13 As a stateless group, with no access to travel documents, they are compelled to use irregular means to travel, relying on networks of brokers to pass through internal checkpoints and international borders. Without work permits or residence permits, they are also confined to working in the informal and unregulated sectors of the economy, often experiencing precarious and unsafe working conditions as well as escalating household debts.14 This leaves them vulnerable to danger during the journey, in transit countries, and on arrival. Over the past decade, many incidents have been documented of extortion of family members, deaths en route, torture and arbitrary detention, sexual violence, forced labour, debt bondage and other forms of exploitation.15 Whilst all Rohingya are subject to various risks and forms of exploitation, migration experiences are often gendered. Rohingya women and girls can face a particular set of insecurities and immobilities due to intersectional forms of discrimination that play out at the national, community and household levels. Women and girls often encounter greater barriers to accessing education, training and income earning opportunities in Rakhine, and reduced decision-making power within the household. Further, since many Rohingya men have been forced to flee Rakhine State, Rohingya women are often sent abroad for marriage to Rohingya men.16 The prevalence of insecurities and risks associated with gender-based violence, sexual violence and sexual exploitation in Rakhine also become drivers of migration outside Myanmar where families seek safety and financial security for women and girls within the household. 2. THE POST-COUP SITUATION FOR ROHINGYA IN RAKHINE – INCREASING INSECURITIES AND RESTRICTIONS “ Currently, there’s power competition between SAC forces and the AA. Rohingya are caught in the middle of those tensions. They have to listen to both armed actors…Rohingyas are facing pressure and threats from the military who warned them to inform them of AA movement in their areas, but AA also puts pressure on Rohingya to cooperate with them.” ROHINGYA COMMUNITY LEADER Following the military coup in Myanmar on 1 February 2021,17 there have been increasing struggles between SAC and ULA-AA over control of the territory and the administrative, judicial and taxation systems in Rakhine State. To further compound the power struggles playing out in Rakhine State, the parallel government, called National Unity Government (NUG),18 is also contesting control of the central state under a federal democratic charter, with its own armed forces, revenue structures, ministries and international representatives.19 Whilst SAC seeks to maintain control over the central state including Rakhine State, ULA-AA seeks self-determination for Rakhine.20 ULA-AA leader General Twan Mrat Naing has stated that he is taking a ‘wait and see’ approach as to whether they will seek to join the NUG’s federal union or seek independence. An ‘informal cease-fire’ is in place between the ULA-AA and SAC in Rakhine. As political analyst, Kyaw Lynn, explained, For Rohingya AA soldiers are participating in fighting against the Tatmadaw with EAO allies in other parts of the country; and, at the same time, ULA leaders have refrained from participating in the NUG, formed by NLD MPs-elect and other anti-SAC actors to challenge the legitimacy of the SAC.21 5