2020 Statelessness & Citizenship Review 2(2) decision was contrary to the aim of art 53(2). 48 It is notable that when concluding its discussion of this issue, the Court gave a warning about the consequences of deporting stateless persons. The Court stated that it had been apparent to the Japanese government that: [T]he plaintiff is not only a refugee but also a stateless person, and there is an absence of prospective states to accept him; and thus, the plaintiff loses his place on earth when a deportation order is issued. 49 REASONING The judgment of the Tokyo High Court offers a valuable perspective on the Japanese and international jurisprudence concerning protection of stateless persons under the Refugee Convention. In the discussion of the first issue regarding the Minister of Justice’s disposition denying recognition of the plaintiff as a refugee, the Court articulated the implications as to how statelessness is related to the terms ‘persecution’ and ‘well-founded fear of being persecuted’ in determining refugee status. First, the Court found that the plight of stateless persons can be perceived as ‘persecution’ even within the judicial and administrative environment where a rigid and narrow interpretation of the term ‘persecution’ is generally employed. Regarding the interpretation of persecution, Japanese judicial and administrative practices tend to recognise only violations of freedoms related to physical harm as such, and they hesitate to include violations of other types of freedom, that is to say, economic and social rights. 50 Yet, stateless persons are often subjected to situations of inequity that can limit their full enjoyment of economic and social rights. 51 Thus, when this minimalist approach in interpreting the term is employed, the distress that stateless persons face could be entirely dismissed. In the present judgment, the Tokyo High Court did not intend to alter the established approach for interpreting the term ‘persecution’. However, it attempted to link the human rights situation of stateless persons to persecution, even if the term is narrowly defined. The Court implied that the denial of a stateless person’s right to property could reach such a serious degree as to amount to persecution when the basis of their livelihood or subsistence is unsecured. 52 Secondly, it is unique in the jurisprudence of refugee law that the refusal of reentry to a stateless person is discussed in the context of a ‘well-founded fear of being persecuted’ when evaluating if a harm is ongoing, as it was in this case. The Tokyo High Court understood the past discriminatory policy against nonGeorgians that endangered their livelihoods in Georgia. On the other hand, it found no evidence to support the argument that, in terms of the general human rights situation, non-Georgians are currently facing a risk of systematic and serious harm. However, the Court distinguished the plaintiff’s case from others. Presumably the logic of the Court is that, despite termination of the discriminatory policy in Georgia, there is no evidence to support a finding that anti-non-Georgian sentiment has disappeared. The Court presumed that the government of Georgia 48 49 50 51 52 ibid 30–31. ibid 30. Osamu Arakaki, Refugee Law and Practice in Japan (Ashgate 2008) 165–73. Arakaki (n 4) 78, citing Kate Darling, ‘Protection of Stateless Persons in International Asylum and Refugee Law’ (2009) 21(4) International Journal of Refugee Law 742, 760–63. Tokyo High Court, Heisei 30 232 (n 6) 27. 322