138 COLUM. J. RACE & L. [Vol. 11:83 requirement of systemic racial discrimination and even, arguably, apartheid. 240 To take a paradigmatic example, the Nazi policy of stripping citizenship of Jewish people is accurately characterized as a measure “calculated to prevent a racial group or groups from participation in the political, social, economic and cultural life of the country,” and deliberately creating “conditions preventing the full development of such a group or groups.”241 However, it is our contention that such a high bar is not in fact required. While some historical and contemporary examples of racialized citizenship laws will satisfy the definition of apartheid, it is not necessary to do so in order to violate the jus cogens norm. As explained above, Special Rapporteur Tladi’s 2019 report cites a wide range of sources that overwhelmingly favor a broader definition of the jus cogens norm, with serious, severe, or systemic racial discrimination widely understood to constitute a violation. 242 There is no reason in principle why intention is required in order for racial discrimination to reach the level of serious, severe, or even systemic.243 While there is little to no explicit consideration of the role of intent or purpose within academic discussion on this issue—perhaps not surprising given that deep analysis of the content of the norm is often scant—contemporary understandings of the definition of racial discrimination unequivocally support the notion that racial discrimination may be established in the absence of explicit intent or purpose. As the Special Rapporteur on Contemporary Forms of Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia, and Related Intolerance clearly articulates, the prohibition on racial discrimination requires states to combat both intentional discrimination as well as discrimination in effect. 244 The language of ICERD Article 1(1) enshrines this principle, stipulating that any distinction, etc. based on a prohibited ground is to be considered racial discrimination when it has “the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal footing, of human rights and ¶ 91. 240 Special Rapporteur, Fourth Report on Jus Cogens, supra note 212, 241 Apartheid Convention, supra note 235, art. 2. 242 Special Rapporteur, Fourth Report on Jus Cogens, supra note 212. 243 For an excellent discussion of intention in the context of ICERD, see E. Tendayi Achiume, Beyond Prejudice: Structural Xenophobic Discrimination Against Refugees, 45 GEO. J. INT’L L. 323, 361–64 (2014). 244 Special Rapporteur Report on Contemporary Forms of Racism, supra note 36, ¶ 18.