88 COLUM. J. RACE & L. [Vol. 11:83 be able to rely on sovereignty-based claims in devising and operating their nationality laws. To be sure, in recent years—often informed by General Recommendations issued by the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (Committee)—numerous scholars have advanced narrowly construed interpretations of Article 1(3). However, these have often been put forward without robust justification. To a certain degree, the discourse around Article 1(3) appears to be self-referential, with scholars referring both to each other and to the same Committee General Recommendation Thirty (examined further below) as if caught in an echo chamber. The dearth of sustained scholarly attention around Article 1(3) makes it difficult to convincingly mount the argument that states are constrained with respect to discriminatory nationality laws. At the same time, scholars point to racial nondiscrimination as a jus cogens of international law in building the case that states are constrained in matters of nationality, but often without critical reflection. As John Tobin writes, “[a]ll too often . . . [the] process of defining the content of a human right is accompanied by scant, if any, explanation of the methodology used to generate the interpretation offered.” 16 The same, according to Tobin, may be said of some of the work of treaty bodies. 17 New grounds are needed upon which to advance a narrow reading of Article 1(3), as well as a more developed understanding of the intersection between the prohibition of racial discrimination and the interpretive principles around jus cogens in the context of nationality. This Article addresses the lacuna in existing legal scholarship, and indeed in jurisprudential analysis, of racial discrimination in nationality matters, by undertaking the first in-depth examination of the history, interpretation, and application of Article 1(3) of ICERD and its consistency with the jus cogens prohibition on racial discrimination. In doing so, this Article offers a nuanced reading of Article 1(3), and suggests that the peremptory norm of racial non-discrimination provides a robust justification for a narrowly circumscribed construal of Article 1(3). While focused explicitly on a particular treaty provision, this analysis raises larger and vital questions about race, nationality, and statelessness—matters that are historically pertinent and have profound ongoing relevance. This 16 John Tobin, Seeking to Persuade: A Constructive Approach to Human Rights Treaty Interpretation, 23 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 1, 1 (2010). 17 See id. at 2.