2021] NATIONALITY LAWS 125 to Article 1(1), Article 1(3) should be narrowly construed.178 But in general, no clear justification has been put by the Committee for essentially having read Article 1(3) out of the Convention in its General Recommendation Thirty, at least in the context of deprivation of nationality. To the contrary, the instances cited above where Article 1(3) has been considered by the Committee suggest an ongoing role for the exception, confusing rather than illuminating the Committee’s vision of the relationship between Article 1(3) and Article 5(d)(iii) as articulated in General Recommendation Thirty. Our comprehensive analysis of the Committee’s approach to racial discrimination in nationality laws points to two key ongoing problems. First, the Committee has continued to use relatively soft language in response 179 to states parties’ invocation of state sovereignty to justify discriminatory nationality laws. 180 Indeed, in one of the few individual communications directly to challenge the implementation of nationality laws, the state party, Switzerland, relied explicitly on 178 Contrary to THORNBERRY, supra note 2, it might be argued that the rule of restrictive interpretation ought to apply here, that is, in favor of the freedom of state sovereignty, but as Article 1(3) relates to a State’s negative obligation (to refrain from discriminating against a particular nationality), deference to state sovereignty is not necessarily warranted as a matter of interpretation. For discussion of restrictive interpretation, see, for example, H. Lauterpacht, Restrictive Interpretation and the Principle of Effectiveness in the Interpretation of Treaties, 26 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 48 (1949); OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW 1279 (Robert Jennings & Arthur Watts eds., 2008); ULF LINDERFALK, ON THE INTERPRETATION OF TREATIES 280–84 (2007). See also BROWNLIE, supra note 63, at 635; ARNOLD MCNAIR, THE LAW OF TREATIES 765– 66 (1961) (noting that the rule “is believed to be now of declining importance”); Territorial Jurisdiction of the International Commission of the River Oder (U.K. v. Pol.), Judgment, 1929 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 23, at 26 (Sept. 10). 179 See Comm. on Elimination Racial Discrimination, Concluding Observations on Kuwait, ¶ 31, U.N. Doc. CERD/C/KWT/CO/21-24 (Sept. 19, 2017) (“While noting the State party’s position regarding the sovereign nature of nationality issues, the Committee remains concerned that the Nationality Act does not allow Kuwaiti women who marry foreigners to pass on their nationality to their children and spouses on an equal footing with Kuwaiti men.”). 180 Comm. on Elimination Racial Discrimination, Concluding Observations on Kuwait: Addendum, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. CERD/C/KWT/CO/2124/Add.1. (Nov. 12, 2018) (“It should be emphasized at the outset that the granting of nationality is a sovereign right of the State, and that cases are assessed in the light of the State’s fundamental interests.”). See also Comm. on Elimination Racial Discrimination, Concluding Observations on Dominican Republic, U.N. Doc. CERD/C/DOM/CO/13-14 (Apr. 19, 2013). Estonia has put forward the reservation of “cultural heritage” as a justification for discriminatory nationality laws. Comm. on Elimination Racial Discrimination, Concluding Observations on Estonia, ¶ 15, U.N. Doc. CERD/C/EST/CO/7 (Oct. 19 2006).