JOURNAL OF ETHNIC AND MIGRATION STUDIES
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Turkishness as rooted in ethnolinguistic Turkism and Sunni-Muslim Islam (Erdal,
Doeland, and Tellander 2008; Yilmaz 2021). Both notions shape the legal framework
for naturalization, as regulated in the Citizenship Law and the Settlement Law in
various iterations. Through the Citizenship Law, naturalization can occur through mar
riage, through a regular pathway for immigrants based on residential and
other requirements, and in exceptional circumstances. For the regular naturalization
pathway, the parallel Settlement Law restricts who counts as an ‘immigrant’ to those
with ‘Turkish descent or culture’ (Kadirbeyoglu 2007), broadly associated with
Turkish ethnicity and Sunni-Muslim religion. As a result, throughout the twentiethcentury immigrants thr majority of naturalized citizens were considered of Turkish
descent, including about 1.6 million Tatars, Circassians and Bulgarians (Kirişçi 1996).
Under the government of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and the Justice and Develop
ment Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP), the possibility for exceptional citizenship
has been expanded, including on discretionary grounds and through investment in prop
erty or businesses (Serdar 2023).
Syrian refugees in Turkey navigate this field of symbolic belonging and formal criteria
for Turkish citizenship. Following Bashar Al-Assad’s brutal crackdown on the Syrian
revolution in 2011, about four million Syrians have registered for temporary
protection status in Turkey. Temporary protection in theory provides protection from
deportation and access to some social rights such as free primary healthcare and edu
cation (Baban, Ilcan, and Rygiel 2021). Syrians under temporary protection can
also apply for the kızılaykart cash assistance, funded by the EU and distributed by the
Turkish Red Crescent (Ark-Yıldırım and Smyrl 2021). The Presidency for Migration
Management, the authority responsible for issuing registration documents, can refer
temporary protection holders to UNHCR for resettlement to a third country.
Despite this bundle of social rights, temporary protection does not count as ‘full’
refugee status according to the 1951 Geneva Convention and has been termed a status
of ‘precarity’ (Baban, Ilcan, and Rygiel 2021). While it is temporally indefinite, the
status can be revoked by presidential decree at any time. Access to work permits relies
on the goodwill of employers who more often hire Syrians as a cheap, informal and
exploitable workforce (Ertorer 2021). Many struggle to access housing. Landlords
often refuse to rent to Syrians and some municipalities have formally banned renting
flat to foreigners (Ertorer 2021). Syrians under temporary protection are excluded
from the broader social security systems of Turkey (Ark-Yıldırım and Smyrl
2021). Right to residence, healthcare and education are limited to the province of regis
tration, or require re-registration which many governorates have stopped since
2018 (Şahin Mencütek et al. 2023). To travel to another province, temporary protection
holders require state permission which is often delayed or rejected, even for short visits.
As a result, Syrians who move to another province to find work, access education, or
unite with family members live in de facto irregularity. If caught, they should be deported
to the province of registration but refoulement back to Syria is common (Şahin Mencütek
2022). Syrians under temporary protection also risk losing their status if they leave
Turkey. Syrian mobility is thus characterised by "precarious movement", both within
and beyond Turkish territory (Baban, Ilcan and Rygiel 2021, 9).
Crucially, temporary protection status cannot be changed to a regular residence
permit excluding Syrians from the regular pathway towards naturalization. However,