12 P. ZISS point is that structural discrimination did not end upon formal inclusion and was experi­ enced as simultaneously mobilizing and immobilizing. Additionally, the Turkish passport rendered mobility strategies more difficult that Syrians had access to as refugees. For example, Turkish citizenship would prevent Syrians from filing applications for resettlement to a third country such as the EU or the USA, as some interlocutors with temporary protection argued. Ameena, a 48-yearold Syrian under temporary protection was living in Istanbul with her husband and four teenage children. Her 17-year-old son had a neurological condition and was unable to find adequate treatment in Turkey. As a result, her family had applied for reset­ tlement through the Turkish Presidency for Migration Management and UNHCR. She was confident about the outcome as two of her sisters had resettled to Europe (one from Turkey to Sweden, the other one from Lebanon to Germany). For her, citizenship of Turkey was associated with the inability to travel and immobility: I don’t like this citizenship and I don’t want citizenship. I want them to give me [the oppor­ tunity to] travel and that they take me abroad, so my son gets treatment. If she was invited to apply for Turkish citizenship, Ameena was worried that she would no longer qualify for refugee resettlement and would not be able to get treatment for her son abroad. Despite the greater ‘power’ of the Turkish passport, it would foreclose reset­ tlement, a mobility strategy that relied upon her family staying refugees. These immobilizing effects of Turkish citizenship was again compounded by ongoing racist discrimination as Syrians. While the Turkish passport would allow interlocutors to stay in Turkey, very few interlocutors intended to do so, independent of whether they held Turkish citizenship or temporary protection. Indeed, the continued discrimination of Syrians, even with citizenship of Turkey, had psychological effects on all Syrians. Thus, Walee, in a joint interview with two friends who held temporary protection, nodded along when his friend Mahmood, a Kurdish-Syrian with temporary protection, summarized: No matter how much you develop yourself, no matter how much you achieved, you will be seen as ‘Syrian’. Even when you take citizenship, you are Syrian. I mean, this is the thing that affects those Syrians who are leaving Turkey to other countries. Because of this pressure, the psychological pressure. While citizenship in Turkey was associated with freedom of mobility both within and outside of Turkey for some, interlocutors’ ongoing treatment as Syrians, associated with racist discrimination, left this potential mobility with a bitter aftertaste, and a strong sense of exclusion. As a consequence, some interlocutors were making plans to leave via irregular means, including those with Turkish passports. However, again the Turkish passport both enabled and hindered mobility strategies. Interlocutors highlighted that they would struggle to be granted asylum in a European country as Turkish passport holders. In Germany, for example, where many interlocutors had family, a majority of asylum appli­ cations of applicants with Turkish citizenship are rejected whereas almost all Syrian citi­ zens are granted international protection (BAMF 2023). Once in a preferred country of asylum, naturalized Syrians with citizenship of Turkey would thus have to decide whether to apply as Turkish citizens, albeit of Syrian origin, or obscuring their