international law, instead of subjected to punitive measures.49 These obligations are owed to victims regardless of the passage of time. Citizenship deprivation is analogous to a criminal prosecution and is a “penalty” as per Article 26 of the Council of Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings 46. Nationality is an “inherent attribute” of every person and should never be withdrawn as a punishment or reprisal.50 Citizenship deprivation is permanent, irreversible and carries a significant punitive effect. Not only is it a sanction or punishment, but also it is so disproportionate that it cannot serve as a legitimate purpose for an administrative process under international law.51 47. A decision to deprive citizenship through an administrative process devoid of the basic protections offered by a criminal trial and thereby impose one of the most severe penalties possible has been found to be tantamount to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. In Trop v. Dulles, the United States Supreme Court found that denaturalisation was cruel and unusual because “the punishment strips the citizen of his status in the national and international political community.”52 In addition to directly constituting inhumane treatment, the consequences of citizenship deprivation, such as leaving the individual stateless, may also violate this provision of international law and could rise to the level of constituting torture.53 48. Under international law, it is well-established that due process obligations, such as those guaranteed by the Convention under Article 6 in the context of criminal trials, apply to other types of proceedings which, while not necessarily characterised as criminal under domestic law, have an analogous punitive character or stigmatising intent or effect, given the severity of the penalty or other adverse impact that the person concerned risks incurring. The nature, duration or manner of execution of certain sanctions – such as citizenship deprivation – evidence their punitive, “criminal character.”54 Thus, “criminal charges” under Article 14(3) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights “may also extend to acts that are criminal in nature with sanctions that, regardless of their qualification in domestic law, must be regarded as penal because of their purpose, character or severity.”55 Article 6 the Convention also applies to disciplinary and other proceedings, and should also apply to citizenship deprivation.56 49. Without a criminal conviction and the accompanying procedural safeguards of criminal law, citizenship deprivation violates “basic elements of the rule of law.”57 Deprivation of citizenship rendering individuals effectively stateless removes access to consular protection and, where no State is willing to receive them, leads to de facto indefinite detention, since there is no country to which they can be deported.58 This Court has previously held that stateless persons are highly vulnerable to be “left to languish for months and years” without State protection.59 The UN Secretary General has similarly stated that “stateless persons are […] uniquely vulnerable to prolonged detention and States should be sensitised to respect the rights of stateless persons to be free from arbitrary detention as a result of their stateless status.”60 Such prolonged or indefinite detentions are inherently arbitrary, particularly where imposed in the absence of due process guarantees.61 In 49 UN Committee on the Rights of the Child, General Comment No. 24 (2019), paras 97-101; see also Security Council resolution 2427 (2018). 50 Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, ‘Third Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Chile’ (1977) OEA/Ser.L/V/II.40, Chapter 9, para. 10. 51 UN Economic and Social Council, A Study of Statelessness (August 1949) UN Docs E/1112; E/1112/Add.1, p. 146: “Deprivation of nationality should not be applied as a punishment”. 52 United States Supreme Court, Trop v Dulles, 356 US 86 (1958). 53 African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Amnesty International v Zambia (1999), Communication 212/98. See also African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, John K. Modise v Botswana (2000), Communication 97/93_14AR. 54 See, inter alia, Engel and Others v. The Netherlands, (Application no. 5100/71; 5101/71; 5102/71; 5354/72; 5370/72), Judgment, 8 June 1976. 55 Human Rights Committee, ‘General Comment No. 32: Article 14: Right to equality before courts and tribunals and to a fair trial’ (2007) CCPR/C/GC/32, para. 15. 56 ECtHR, Marusic v. Croatia (2017), Application no. 79821/12, paras 72-73 57 Commentary to the Principles on Deprivation of Nationality as a National Security Measure (2020) 58 UN High Commissioner for Refugees, UNHCR Brief on Statelessness and Detention Issues, 27 November 1997. Human Rights Committee, General Comment No 35: Article 9 (Liberty and Security of Person), 16 December 2014, para 18: The inability of a State party to carry out the expulsion of an individual because of statelessness or other obstacles does not justify indefinite detention. 59 ECtHR, Kim v Russia (2014), Application no. 44260/13, para 54. 60 UN Secretary-General, Guidance Note of the Secretary General: The United Nations and Statelessness, June 2011. 61 Human Rights Committee, General Comment No 35: Article 9 (Liberty and Security of Person), 16 December 2014, paras 10 – 12; Rights and Security International, Abandoned to Torture: Dehumanising Rights Violations against Children and Women in Northeast Syria, 2025. 9