2023] SPECTER OF STATELESSNESS 333 Further, this specter of statelessness has broader implications for international law and institutional governance.5 The Framework Convention just approved a loss and damage mechanism at Sharm-el Sheikh Egypt—a critical first step in compensating poorer nations from climate harm inflicted by wealthier nations.6 Recent loss and damage progress suggests that the Framework Convention and follow-on Conference of Parties can evolve to address critical issues as they arise. Relatedly, failure to protect nations from climate impacts could well delegitimize the U.N. Charter—a system that is predicated on the sovereign equality of all its Member States.7 While far from perfect, since its inception the Charter has played a stabilizing role in upholding the sovereignty of all its Members through the prohibition on the use of force and the protection of territorial integrity.8 Climate change is a unique threat no less dangerous than armed attacks and traditional use of force conceptions—witness the uptick in extreme weather and storm surge that eviscerate coastlines and damage freshwater drinking supplies.9 Although international law recognizes that each nation possesses the inherent right of selfdefense in the event of an armed attack, we lack a corresponding governance model and vernacular to address complex, diffuse environmental attacks.10 Advances in greenhouse gas (“GHG”) reporting and modeling now shine light on the nations responsible for a disproportionate share of climate harm. This spotlight raises novel questions of climate justice and liability for damage already caused by the world’s emitters.11 Does the world have the tools to prevent or 5. For an outstanding discussion of the legal issues facing Tuvalu and Kiribati in the face of climatedriven statelessness, see Jane McAdam, Disappearing States, Statelessness, and the Boundaries of International Law in CLIMATE CHANGE AND DISPLACEMENT: MULTIDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES 105130 (Jane McAdam ed., 2010). 6. U.N. FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE, COP27 Reaches Breakthrough Agreement on New “Loss and Damage” Fund for Vulnerable Countries, (Nov. 26, 2022). 7. U.N. Charter art. 2 (1) “The Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members.” Professor Stewart astutely notes that despite this principle “the U.N. system is constitutionally unequal due to the inclusion of the veto power to the permanent members of the Security Council.” Stewart, supra note 2, at 20. 8. U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 1, 4. 9. See Storlazzi et al., supra note 2. The Alliance of Small Island Developing States (AOSIS) was established in 1990 and includes 38 U.N. Member States located throughout the world. As a group, SIDS comprise twenty percent of all U.N. members. For a discussion of the history and politics of loss and damage see J. Taub, N. Nasir, M. Feisal Rahman & S. Huq, From Paris to Marrakesh: Global Politics around Loss and Damage’ 72(4) India Quarterly 317, 322 (2016); E. Calliari, O. Serdeczny & L. Vanhala, Making Sense of the Politics in the Climate Loss and Damage Debate, 64 GLOB. ENVT’L. CHANGE 102133 (2020). 10. But see Craig Martin, Atmospheric Intervention? The Climate Crisis and the Jus ad Bellum Regime, 45 COLUM. J. ENVT’L. L. 321 (2020) (describing possible international legal solutions to address climate impacts). For an outstanding overview of the role the Security Council might play in addressing climate change, see CLIMATE CHANGE AND THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL (Shirley V. Scott & Charlotte Ku, eds., 2018). 11. At the time of this writing, the United States is the largest historical emitter of GHG emissions while China emits more GHG emissions on an annual basis than any Member nation. See Ctr. for Climate & Energy Sols., Global Emissions, C2ES (last visited Feb. 27, 2021), https://perma.cc/Z8FESWEX. Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4223806