The purpose of Article 1D was thus to provide a non-permanent bar to Convention protection; at the time of drafting, it was thought that the Palestine refugee problem would be resolved on the basis of the principles laid down in UNGA Resolution 194(III), particularly through repatriation and compensation in accordance with paragraph 11, and that protection under the 1951 Convention would ultimately be unnecessary. However, should there be no settlement, then it was essential to avoid any lacuna in the provision of international protection. The refugee character of the protected constituency was never in dispute. Hence, in the absence of settlement in accordance with relevant General Assembly resolutions, no new determination of eligibility for Convention protection would be required. They would “ipso facto” / “de plein droit” benefit from the Convention regime. The travaux préparatoires clearly show the United Nations and member states determining, as a matter of policy, that Palestinian refugees were presumed to be in need of international protection, and that in certain circumstances they would accordingly and automatically fall within the 1951 Convention. Clearly, the expectations of the international community in 1949-1951 have failed to materialize in many ways. The “problem” is unresolved, and institutional measures taken to promote a solution (such as the United Nations Conciliation Commission) have been frustrated in their work. Over the years, the international dimensions to the Palestinian issue have magnified, not only at the political level, but also at the individual level, as more and more Palestinians sought and found employment and settlement opportunities outside UNRWA’s area of operations, or were obliged to move again because of violence and armed conflict. When their legal status was at issue, when they were expelled from their country of residence, or sought asylum elsewhere for compelling reasons, so the problems of interpretation and application emerged; sense had to be made of rather incomplete and often unclear texts. In a number of jurisdictions, decision-makers appear to have relied on the textual inconsistency highlighted above, to the prejudice of Palestinian refugees. In particular, instead of applying the 1951 Convention automatically to Palestinians outside UNRWA’s area of operations and no longer enjoying protection or assistance, many states required a separate determination of well-founded fear, treating the Palestinian like any other asylum seeker. In this way, a provision intended to help them has in fact worked against their best interests. In Europe, at least, certain problematic interpretations of Article 1D of the 1951 Convention, adopted by national courts have been laid to rest in two important judgments of the Court of Justice of the European Union (the Bolbol and El Kott cases). x Applying Article 1D with due regard to historical context, the Court rightly stressed the importance of ensuring continuity of protection for Palestinian refugees. It rejected the view that only Palestinians receiving protection or assistance in 1951 came within Article 1D’s contingent inclusion provisions, and that the reference to cessation of protection and assistance implied nothing less than the winding up of Handbook on Protection of Palestinian Refugees