S878 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW [56:S855 reinserted because of the persistence 146 of the French delegate, distinguished human rights advocate René Cassin, who insisted that “[e]very person had a right to legal protection.” 147 The categorical inaccessibility of diplomatic protection would render an individual stateless. Notwithstanding the primacy of diplomatic protection, the “mere fact of protection,” alone, could not render an individual a national of the protecting State. 148 ii. Right of Entry The passport practices that arose during World War I and solidified through World War II—exacerbating the mass displacement crisis—rendered the right of entry a second salient component of nationality. Scholars argued that post-World War II customary international law obligated States to admit their own nationals. 149 Paul Weis suggested that the obligation to admit was an obligation “inherent” in the concept of nationality. 150 H.F. van Panhuys wrote that “[t]he duty to admit nationals is considered so important a consequence of nationality that it is almost equated with it.” 151 Judgments from international tribunals 152 and the practice of States 153 confirm that the right to entry inhered in nationality. 154 146. Comm’n on Human Rights, Summary Record of the Sixtieth Meeting of the Commission on Human Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/SR.60 (June 23, 1948); Comm’n on Human Rights, Ninety-Second Meeting, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.92 (Oct. 2, 1948); Comm’n on Human Rights, France: Amendments to the Draft Declaration, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/244 (Oct. 8, 1948); Comm’n on Human Rights, Hundred and Twenty-Second Meeting, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.122 (Nov. 4, 1948). 147. Id. 148. PANHUYS, supra note 115, at 65. Note that several treaties concluded in the context of demilitarization or decolonization entitled former powers to exercise diplomatic protection on behalf of their denationalized former-nationals. See, e.g., Treaty of Versailles art. 127, June 28, 1919, 2 Bevans 235 (“[T]he native inhabitants of the former German oversea possessions shall be entitled to the diplomatic protection of the Governments exercising authority over those territories.”). 149. WEIS, supra note 1, at 47; PANHUYS, supra note 115, at 55–56; PLENDER, supra note 125, at 133. 150. WEIS, supra note 1, at 47. 151. PANHUYS, supra note 115, at 55–56. 152. See, e.g., Van Duyn v. Home Office, Case 41/74, (European Court of Justice, 1974). 153. PLENDER, supra note 125, at 135 (listing roughly fifty States, including Chile, Egypt, Malaysia, and Spain, that have constitutional provisions protecting their nationals’ right to entry and noting that several States, like India and the United Kingdom, link the right to entry and the right of residence). 154. See, e.g., R. v. Soon Gin An, 3 D.L.R. 125 (Canada, 1941). Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2954729