2018] NATIONALITY AND DEFINING “THE RIGHT TO HAVE RIGHTS” S873 The Allies and the academy defined themselves in opposition to Axis persecution, legally enabled by the stripping of rights through targeted denationalization. The rhetorical framing of World War II galvanized peoples, politicians, and international law scholars alike. World War II thus brought about a paradigmatic shift in international law. The purely State-based system that persisted in the interwar period succumbed to the notion of individuals as the subjects, not the objects, of law. The recognition of individuals as rights-bearers rejected the core holding of Dickson Car Wheel Company; 111 nationality would serve at most as the basis for enforcing rights, not as the basis for having rights. B. Changes in Practice and New Regulations in International Law In the wake of World War II, Allied States and scholars began asserting that customary international law regarding the extension and implications of nationality had crystallized. Accordingly, international law would regulate nationality, even in the absence of binding treaty obligations. As a conceptual move, the ICJ’s Nottebohm judgment, which rejected Lichtenstein’s ability to exercise diplomatic protection over a recently naturalized individual with limited ties to the State, 112 bifurcated nationality into a concept of international law and a concept of domestic law. “Functional” nationality, operative in international law, would entitle a State to exercise diplomatic protection over its nationals’ claims and would give rise to an international relationship of rights and duties. 113 “Technical” nationality, operative in municipal law, would encompass whatever citizen or non-citizen national relationships a State could want to create, in excess of its international obligations. 114 In contrast to their stance in the interwar period, scholars began recognizing a unified substantive content of nationality in international law, or the “many rules of international law which attach consequences to the fact that a particular individual belongs to the of the individual depends the welfare of the people, the safety of the state and the peace of the world.”). 111. Dickson Car Wheel Company (U.S.A.) v. United Mexican States, 4 R. INT’L ARB. AWARDS 669, 678 (1931). 112. Nottebohm (Liech. v. Guat.), 1955 I.C.J. 4, 20 (Apr. 6). 113. WEIS, supra note 1, at 11; BROWNLIE’S PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 525–26 (8th ed. 2012). 114. WEIS, supra note 1, at 11; BROWNLIE’S PRINCIPLES, supra note 113, at 525–26. Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2954729