A/HRC/46/36 15. Through multiple Security Council resolutions, 59 a United Nations infrastructure has developed, namely, sanctions committees which administer the “blacklists” of individuals and entities listed. The absence of adequate and comprehensive legal oversight of sanctions regimes has been the subject of sustained concern for national courts, 60 regional courts61 and human rights actors, including holders of this mandate. Responding in part to those concerns, the Security Council adopted resolution 1904 (2009) establishing the Office of the Ombudsperson to receive, consider and make recommendations on requests for names to be removed from the sanctions list.62 All holders of the office of the Ombudsperson have been recognized jurists of integrity,63 yet, despite their best efforts to work within the constraints of the procedures provided,64 disquiet remains about listing on rule of law grounds. Persons are targeted often on unclear or non-independent grounds. The basis of the information provided has been rightly critiqued by those who see it, specifically the Ombudsperson. 65 The process is highly politicized, and the rights of the targeted individuals and their families play no meaningful role in the outcomes or deliberations concerning listing. Notwithstanding the fact that the Office of the Ombudsperson undertakes important and valuable work to delist, the process provides neither a fair process nor a fair remedy to those who are subject to it, as is required by international law.66 16. The impact of counter-terrorism sanctions and listing on women, girls and families are wide-ranging. The impact of sanctions goes far beyond the effects on a particular listed individual. If listed,67 women, like men, are subject to an opaque and Kafkaesque political process which affects their political, social, economic and cultural rights; the consequences are severe and raise fundamental concerns of a lack of legality, legal certainty and proportionality.68 For example, securing work is difficult (article 6 of International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights); renting or purchasing a home will be challenging, if not impossible (article 25 (1) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights); travel is prohibited (article 13 (2) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights ); accepting financial assistance makes other persons criminally liable, inter alia, affecting the family (article 16 59 There are 14 active sanctions committees, including those established pursuant to Security Council resolutions 751 (1992); 1267 (1999), 1989 (2011) and 2253 (2015); 1518 (2003); 1533 (2004); 1591 (2005); 1636 (2005); 1718 (2006); 1970 (2011); 1988 (2011); 2048 (2012); 2127 (2013); 2140 (2014); 2206 (2015); and 2374 (2017). 60 Supreme Court of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Her Majesty’s Treasury v. Ahmed and others, judgment of 27 January 2010, UKSC 2, in which Lord Hope commented on sanctions as a unique global legal weapon that made individual suspects “effectively prisoners of the state”, without any political or legal redress; Federal Court of Canada, Abdelrazik v. Canada, decision of 5 June 2009; and European Court of Human Rights (Grand Chamber), Al-Dulimi and Montana Management Inc. v. Switzerland (application No. 5809/08), judgment of 21 June 2016. 61 European Union, Court of Justice (Grand Chamber), Yassin Abdullah Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v. Council of the European Union and others (joined cases Nos. C-402/05 P & C-415/05 P), judgment of 3 September 2008. 62 The procedure was updated through Security Council resolution 1989 (2011), although it was not substantially improved from a due process perspective. 63 The Special Rapporteur concurs with the previous mandate holder, Ben Emmerson, that the mechanism is as fair as possible within the limits of its mandate, but the structural flaws of the regime remain despite the appearance of independence (A/67/396, para. 34). 64 See www.un.org/securitycouncil/ombudsperson/approach-and-standard. 65 For example, the lack of mandate for the Ombudsperson to review the Committee’s original decision to list; the lack of equality of arms regarding information available to petitioners; the lack of formal judicial independence for the Ombudsperson and the scope and nature of the terms of appointment (in practice and contractually, given that the term is for a period of approximately one year); the lack of entitlement to a United Nations laissez-passer; the less favourable contract terms than those that apply to comparable judicial positions, despite being formally described as a mandate; and the failure of States to allow for reasoned (if redacted, as necessary) opinions to explain the reasoned decisions of the Ombudsperson. 66 Concerns include breach of article 10 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and articles 2 and 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and incompatibility with the Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary. 67 As of 21 December 2020, only four women were listed. See the list established and maintained pursuant to Security Council resolutions 1267 (1999), 1989 (2011) and 2253 (2015). 68 A/61/267, paras. 32–37; and A/67/396, paras. 33–35. 9