56 Azadeh Dastyari and Asher Hirsch Australia to those who are inadequately or irregularly documented.”4 The Australian Migration Act of 1958 (Cth) makes it an offence to transport a non-citizen to Australia without a visa or documentation.5 In addition, airlines and ship companies are responsible for removing passengers from Australia if they are refused entry after arrival. To make it explicitly clear that carrier sanctions apply even to those with genuine protection claims, Section 228B(2) of Australia’s Migration Act provides: “a noncitizen includes a reference to a non-citizen seeking protection or asylum (however described), whether or not Australia has, or may have, protection obligations in respect of the non-citizen because the non-citizen is or may be a refugee, or for any other reason.” This makes it clear that airlines and other carriers will be fined even if the non-citizen they have brought to Australia is found to be a refugee and owed legal protection in Australia. This is in contrast to the policies of other countries.6 For example, in the European Union, sanctions “may in some cases be waived if the passenger is found to be a refugee.”7 However, since carriers do not conduct refugee status determinations prior to boarding, the changes of an airline allowing refugeeclaimant to board a plane – and thereby risk a fine – are slim. Taylor argues that carrier sanctions have succeeded in reducing the number of refugees arriving by air: “The fact that the number of infringement notices actually served on carriers has been dropping markedly from year to year indicates that sanctions have had their intended effect.”8 Airlines are unlikely to be sympathetic to the claims of refugees seeking to board, and even if they are, they do not have adequate expertise to assess refugee claims before departure. Even for those who are sympathetic, the financial impact of carrier sanctions would eventually outweigh any humanitarian concern.9 Carrier sanctions mean that refugees are stopped outside of Australian territory – before they board the plane – and that the process of border control is carried out by a private company.10 This privatization of border control adds an additional complication for those seeking protection. There are legal implications when private S. Taylor, “Offshore Barriers to Asylum Seeker Movement: The Exercise of Power without Responsibility?,” in J. McAdam (ed.), Forced Migration, Human Rights and Security (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2008), p. 100. 5 Migration Act 1958, No. 62, 1958, §§ 229, 232. 6 A. Brouwer and J. Kumain, “Interception and Asylum: When Migration Control and Human Rights Collide” (2003) 21(4) Refuge: Canada’s Journal on Refugees 6–24 at 10; Taylor, “Offshore Barriers to Asylum Seeker Movement,” p. 101. 7 T. Baird, “Carrier Sanctions in Europe: A Comparison of Trends in 10 Countries” (2017) 19(3) European Journal of Migration and Law 307–334 at 326. 8 Taylor, “Offshore Barriers to Asylum Seeker Movement,” p. 100. 9 Ibid., p. 101. 10 S. Scholten, “The Privatisation of Immigration Control through Carrier Sanctions: The Role of Private Transport Companies in Dutch and British Immigration Control,” in J. Niessen and E. Guild (eds.), Immigration and Asylum Law and Policy in Europe (vol. 38, Leiden, Boston: Brill Nijhoff, 2015). 4 https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108914994 Published online by Cambridge University Press