to a political community true to the aporetic spirit of its Arendtian formulation. 3 The legal rationalit imposed on nationalit cannot be the onl a is along which a person s worth i s determined in terms of rights. Instead, we must attend to the multifarious, multi-scalar and contingent historical trajectories of the emergence and attribution of rights (Caglar and Schiller 2018). In this specific context, the endemic nature of statelessness since the 1990s assumes a meaning far apart from one related to region-specific crises. This extreme form of vulnerability has been largely ignored by academia and the innate link between the concept of statelessness and contemporary forms of enslavement have often been reduced to a mere speculation. In the following pages, I posit that statelessness is not an aberration or a radical exception. It is one of the discrete outcomes of processes of the gendered and racialized debasement of citizenship, and stateless people share the same predicament of those who are criminalized on account of their mobility, except they are simultaneously rendered invisible by virtue of lack of recognition of their sheer existence. From extralegal expulsion of people who cannot be repatriated, to the concentrated erosion of the rights of once-citizens, the modes through which people experience statelessness, like citizenship, is not absolute but is experienced as a matter of degrees. The political value of seeing the connections among these seemingly discrete forms of dispossession (i.e. statelessness and precarity) is immense in terms of understanding the making and re-making of regional orders of dispossession, erasure of subjecthood and ultimately, production and maintenance of bonded labour. In terms of its profitability, what and who statelessness involves have remained remarkably consistent (Gordon 2019, 2020). Contemporary conceptions of consent, hand in hand with the systemic obstruction of the vulnerability of others makes statelessness one of the most lucrative Arendt s critique centres on the parado es of human rights and anal ses them in line with a mode of inquir that she associates with Socrates teachings. Aporia in this conte t is not a heralder of a paralysing impasse as declared by Jacques Ranciere in his reading of Arendt (Rancier 1992, 2004). Rather, it can create possibilities of rethinking key concepts especially in times of crises (Gundogdu 2011). Re-reading Arendt, we can see the stateless person as someone whose status exposes the contradiction of state-centred citizenship and the discourse of human rights hinging upon it rather than merely as an institutionalist track. 3 3