Statelessness Working Paper Series No. 2016/02 2016, as well as online communication with those now in European countries.6 A total of 54 people were interviewed across the Kurdistan Region’s three Governorates (Duhok, Erbil and Sulaimaniya), with the conversations focusing on their current situation there, as well as legal and security issues faced by stateless family members elsewhere. Such interviews helped to build up a comprehensive picture of the far-reaching impacts of statelessness on the affected communities. As such, this paper concentrates on the contemporary situation of stateless Kurds from Syria who find themselves outside their home country. The historical context and origins of their statelessness have been dealt with in previous scholarship,7 while human rights and advocacy groups have repeatedly documented the severe violation of fundamental rights experienced by those rendered stateless.8 Given the current context of displacement from Syria, both to neighbouring states and beyond, this paper extends knowledge about the experiences of the country’s stateless Kurds as they become refugees and asylum seekers. Firstly, it deals with the situation of those based in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq. Then, two personal case studies are presented in order to provide insight into the prospects of resettlement as a durable solution, and to highlight the often unacknowledged challenges stateless persons experience within the present European refugee/migrant crisis. 2. Stateless Syrians in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq While the government’s implementation of the 2011 Decree did result in reducing the number of stateless persons, a significant part of Syria’s remaining statelessness problem has now been ‘exported’ to new geographic and legal contexts with the displacement of affected persons out of the country. Indeed, the majority of research participants confirmed that within the Kurdish community still living in Syria there are only a very few ajanib who have not yet acquired Syrian nationality. These are mostly exceptional cases where those affected are unable, apprehensive or unwilling to approach the national authorities to submit their claim. Concerning the maktumeen who were officially excluded from Decree No. 49, it is estimated that only between 4,800 and 5,000 remain across the Hassaka Governorate in Syria, as a result of considerable numbers leaving the region.9 It is arguable that the locus of Syria’s statelessness problem has now shifted towards the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, where the largest population of stateless Kurds outside their country of origin is presently hosted.10 This is in a wider context in which Iraq, with its own history of statelessness – notably as many as 300,000 Faili Kurds stripped of nationality in 198011 – is now facing a growing crisis 6 Given the inherited and connected nature of statelessness in Syria, and the fact that stateless persons in the Kurdistan Region constitute a somewhat scattered sub-population, snowball sampling proved an effective method of identifying research participants. Moreover, those in the KR-I were often able to connect me with stateless relatives and/or acquaintances who had travelled to Europe. 7 For details of the discriminatory and arbitrary implementation of the 1962 census, refer to: KurdWatch, ‘Stateless Kurds in Syria: Illegal invaders or victims of a nationalistic policy?’ (March 2010) Report 5 <http://www.kurdwatch.org/pdf/kurdwatch_staatenlose_en.pdf>; Thomas McGee, Stateless Identity and National I.D.: Kurds in Syria (University of Exeter Masters Thesis, 2012), pp. 49-62. 8 Inter alia, Human Rights Watch, ‘Syria: The Silenced Kurds’ (1996) <https://www.hrw.org/legacy/reports/1996/Syria.htm>; Refugees International, ‘Buried Alive: Status of Kurds in Syria’ (January 2006) <http://www.refworld.org/docid/47a6eba80.html>. 9 Figure provided by the Civil Registry Directory Office in Derik/al-Malikiya in March 2016. The office reports working to collect maktumeen cases for referral to the central offices in Damascus should there become a possibility of their acquiring ajanib or Syrian national status. As yet, no such action has been taken. 10 Though no accurate statistics are available, this finding is supported by REACH/UNHCR, Domiz camp Survey Data, July 2013, as well as by estimations provided by stateless Kurds themselves. 11 Elizabeth Campbell, ‘The Faili Kurds of Iraq: Thirty Years Without Nationality’ (April 2010) Refugees International <http://reliefweb.int/report/iraq/faili-kurds-iraq-thirty-years-without-nationality>. 2