2011] AN INTERNATIONAL LAW OF CITIZENSHIP 735 status.285 At a time when global mobility has produced a surge in the number of birth dual nationals, few states persist in requiring those born with dual nationality to elect one at majority.286 Although the laws of many states (heavily represented among major Asian countries) provide for the termination of citizenship upon naturalization in another country, the number of such states has decreased to the point that it is the minority practice (whereas in the midtwentieth century it was nearly universal), and pressure from immigrant diasporas appears to be further reducing the number of states refusing to recognize multiple nationality.287 Important “sending” states such as the Dominican Republic, Korea, Mexico, the Philippines, and Turkey have undertaken recent nationality law reforms to allow for the retention of nationality upon naturalization elsewhere. Retreating from post-independence bars on multiple nationality, many African states have also moved to accept that status.288 These changes have served state interests (in terms of maintaining ties with emigrant populations that are an important source of foreign exchange and political influence). Dual nationality reforms have also been welcomed by emigrant communities, who otherwise face both a choice between sentimental loyalties and the prospect of losing certain rights in their homelands.289 The closely studied, 1999 German citizenship reforms are again instructive.290 Although an initial proposal to accept dual nationality in most cases was shelved after conservative politicians successfully converted it into a domestic election issue, the amended regime nonetheless relaxed what were high hurdles to maintaining dual nationality. German citizens may now retain their German nationality upon naturalization in another state so long as they can demonstrate continuing ties with Germany—for instance, the existence of family members there. The 1999 law required those naturalizing as German to terminate their original nationalities; subsequent legislation, however, has eliminated that requirement for citizens of other European Union states and Switzerland.291 Under what has been labeled the “option model,” those enjoying birthright citizenship by virtue of noncitizen parental residence in Germany will be required to elect between their German and alternate nationalities at majority. That mechanism will not come into play for years (when those born under the new regime reach the age of eighteen); query whether the mechanism will remain in force at that time.292 Even in the case of naturalizing citizens, the law provides for liberal exceptions for retaining multiple nationality, including when the other state of nationality would impose substantial economic penalties upon the loss of its citizenship. The result in Germany has been the acceptance of dual 285 See, e.g., STANLEY A. RENSHON, THE 50% AMERICAN: IMMIGRATION AND NATIONAL IDENTITY IN AN AGE OF TERROR, ch. 1 (2005). 286 Japan is a notable exception. See Kashiwazaki, supra note 167, at 450 –51. 287 See, e.g., BOLL, supra note 4, at 274. On Japan, see Kashiwazaki, supra note 167, at 451 (“Insisting on the desirability of ‘only one’ nationality, the official stance of the Japanese government therefore deviates from the current international legal norm.”). 288 See MANBY, CITIZENSHIP LAW IN AFRICA, supra note 5, at 58. A clear majority now accepts the status. See id. at 63 (table with state practice showing that thirty of fifty-three African states now permit dual citizenship). 289 See, e.g., Anupam Chander, Diaspora Bonds, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1005 (2001). 290 On the German reforms as relating to dual citizenship, see, for example, Enikõ Horváth & Ruth RubioMarı́n, “Alles Oder Nichts”? The Outer Boundaries of the German Citizenship Debate, 8 INT’L J. CONST. LAW 72 (2010), and Jürgen Gerdes, Thomas Faist, & Beate Rieple, “We Are All ‘Republican’ Now”: The Politics of Dual Citizenship in Germany, in DUAL CITIZENSHIP IN EUROPE, supra note 4, at 45. 291 See Horváth & Rubio-Marı́n, supra note 290, at 79. 292 Id. at 80 – 82 (noting that option model remains contested). This content downloaded from 82.196.111.31 on Thu, 07 Oct 2021 15:20:30 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms