Peoples’ Right to a Nationality case. 76 In this decision, although the Commission did not rule in favour of the people of Katanga, it identified a number of variants to self-determination: be it that of external self-determination or internal self-determination. It then held that the Katangese people should exercise a variant of self-determination that is compatible with the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Zaire. 77 The Commission’s position was, however, different with the 1997 Casamance case, as it did not clearly explain the defining features of ‘peoplehood’ and whether the people of Casamance possess them before rejecting the claim of the Casamance separatists as a people. 78 This was, however, not the case with Gunme and the SCNC v Cameroon in May 2009, where the Commission defined the features of ‘peoplehood’ in line with the 1989 definition of the UNESCO Committee of Experts and decided that: ‘the people of Southern Cameroon’ qualify to be referred to as a ‘people’ because they manifest numerous characteristics and affinities, which include a common history, linguistic tradition, territorial connection, and political outlook. More importantly they identify themselves as a people with a separate and distinct identity… It is up to other external people to recognise such existence, but not to deny it. 79 The Commission’s decision in the aforementioned case is in line with the theory of recognition, whereby communities with distinct identities must be recognised by the state as a people to have a sense of belonging. Moreover, art 20(1) on the peoples’ right to existence is a condition sine qua non for the right to self-determination and all other peoples’ rights enshrined in the Charter. 80 It is the mother of all peoples’ rights as it confers upon individuals and people a ‘legal status’ enshrined in art 5 of the Charter. 81 Ingange-wa-Ingange argues that the right to existence could be applied to ethnic groups within states whose specific physical or socio-cultural existence have to be protected. 82 In the Jawara case, the Commission interpreted the peoples’ right to existence to include the ability to exercise their political rights to freely choose their own governments and leaders, arguing that the 1994 coup against President Jawara was ‘a violation of of the Gambian peoples’ right to freely choose their government entrenched in art 20(1) of the Charter’. 83 The Commission also consecrated the right of people to economic, social and cultural development, enshrined in art 22 in the 2003 Endorois Community v 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 See more at Decisions on Communications: 75/92 Congrès du peuple katangais/ Democratic Republic of the Congo (African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 16th ord sess, 2 March 1995) <https://www.achpr.org/sessions/view?id=63>. ibid [4]–[6]. 10th Activity Report of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights 1996/97 (Report, African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights 1997) <https://www.achpr.org/activityreports/viewall?id=10>. Decisions on Communications: 266/03 Kevin Mgwanga Gunme et al / Cameroon (African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 45th ord sess, 27 May 2009) <https://www.achpr.org/sessions/descions?id=189>. Ingange-wa-Ingange (n 13) 140. Banjul Charter (n 24) art 5: Every individual shall have the right to the respect of the dignity inherent in a human being and to the recognition of his legal status. All forms of exploitation and degradation of man particularly slavery, slave trade, torture, cruel, inhuman, or degrading punishment and treatment shall be prohibited. See Ingange-wa-Ingange, (n 13) 140. ibid 224; Jawara v Gambia (African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Comms 147/95, 149/96, 27th ord sess, 11 May 2000) [65]–[72]. 47