2025 Statelessness & Citizenship Review 7(2) extradition or deportation to China, often without access to Taiwanese consular support or communication with Taiwanese officials or family members.119 This practice exposes these individuals to human rights abuses and contradicts China’s obligations under international agreements, including the Cross-Strait Agreement on Joint Crime-Fighting and Judicial Mutual Assistance Agreement which was adopted by Taiwan and China in 2009.120 While this agreement does not explicitly address jurisdiction or opposability to third states, it was framed as a mechanism to protect the interests of people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait.121 Until 2016, Taiwan and China had in practice largely returned their respective citizens in such cases, reflecting an unwritten tacit understanding on extradition and deportation. 122 This changed after Taiwan elected a president supportive of independence, prompting Beijing to use such transfers to weaken Taiwan’s sovereignty and extend its influence globally. Similar cases have been observed in Cambodia, Kenya, Spain, the Philippines, Armenia and more.123 While the legal discourse of the Liu v Poland case does not directly concern Taiwanese sovereignty, the outcome significantly affects the practice of sovereignty and Taiwanese citizenship. 3 Spillover Effects of Contestation on Taiwanese Sovereignty and Citizenship Taiwan’s statehood has limited its ability to participate in formal diplomatic activities. In addition, its international status has influenced its citizenship practices, regardless of the Chinese Government’s efforts to extend its influence over Taiwanese individuals. This contestation of Taiwan’s status often surfaces in legal cases involving Taiwanese persons. The case of Liu v Poland illustrates the complex implications of contested sovereignty. While the case was ostensibly focused on a human rights issue, specifically concerning the applicant being tortured or otherwise ill-treated upon extradition,124 it indirectly revealed deeper political and legal tensions. As discussed above, the use of extradition and deportation in this context can be viewed as a means of obstructing Taiwan’s exercise of sovereign authority. The judgment confirms general human rights concerns regarding the PRC; it also unintentionally disrupts the strategic use of extradition to undermine Taiwanese sovereignty. This demonstrates how legal decisions, even when not explicitly about sovereignty, can shape how sovereignty and recognition are negotiated in practice. Therefore, this author characterises this as an instance of the spillover effects of contested sovereignty, where disputes over recognition permeate and influence seemingly unrelated legal matters. 119 ‘China’s Hunt For Taiwanese Overseas: The PRC's Use of Extradition and Deportation to Undermine Taiwanese Sovereignty’ (Report, Safeguard Defender, 30 November 2021) . 120 Cross-Strait Joint Crime-Fighting and Judicial Mutual Assistance Agreement, ROC and PRC, signed and entered into force 22 May 2009. 121 Jye-Ching Lee, ‘Theory and Practice on Negotiation of Cross-Strait Criminal Jurisdiction and Transfer of Jurisdiction for Criminal Proceedings － Starting from Negotiation and Proceedings of Jurisdiction for Cross-Border Fraud Suspects in Third Countries’ (2015) 94 Taipei University Law Review 163. 122 Chen Yanling and Liu Yiqi, ‘Cross-Strait Interactions Have Slowed, Resulting in Limited Effectiveness in the Implementation of Certain Provisions under the “Agreement on Joint Crime-Fighting and Mutual Legal Assistance across the Taiwan Strait,” Which Urgently Requires a Breakthrough’ Legislative Yuan, Republic of China (Taiwan) (Web Page, 1 August 2021) <https://www.ly.gov.tw/Pages/Detail.aspx?nodeid=45068&pid=210818>, archived at <perma.cc/74W4-HJ6L>. 123 Safeguard Defender (n 119) 7. 124 Liu v Poland (n 9) [68]–[83], [98]–[104]. 122