The rebels have also denied responsibility for violations of international humanitarian law, in particular the killing of over fifty detained gendarmes and family members in Bouaké in October 2002. They have however acknowledged the increasing lack of discipline among the MPCI troops, citing tensions between the military and political wings in the long period between the signing and the implementation of the Marcoussis accords.204 Accountability for the Bouaké massacre and other reprisal killings will be a vital step towards establishing peace and reconciliation in Côte d’Ivoire. In addition, the continuing questions surrounding the links between the MPCI and the MPIGO, and the chain of command over the Liberian fighters require further investigation in order to establish the command responsibility for their abuses against civilians in the west. The French response France, the ex-colonial power, has had a long and complex relationship with Côte d’Ivoire. Over twenty thousand French nationals were present in the country up to September 2002, and the French retained a military presence in Abidjan, a reflection of the continuing French economic, political, cultural and social interests in the country. A treaty between France and Côte d’Ivoire provided that the French could protect Ivorian territory if it was threatened by an external power.205 Initially, the French forces of Operation Unicorn intervened only to the extent of evacuating Western nationals from areas engulfed by fighting. However, following the first cease-fire between the rebels and the government on October 17, 2002, the French agreed to monitor the cease-fire line. French foreign minister Dominique de Villepin also engaged in considerable diplomatic lobbying with President Gbagbo and the rebel forces, both around the first cease-fire and later. However, French relations with President Gbagbo’s regime deteriorated markedly, particularly after the signing of the Marcoussis accords. President Gbagbo appeared to be increasingly reluctant to implement the accords and did little to stem the demonstrations of the “young patriots.” The French soon found themselves attacked on both sides, by the government who claimed they favored the rebels by not denouncing the insurgency, and by the rebels who claimed that they obstructed the rebel advances on San Pedro and Abidjan. Once French troops agreed to monitor the cease-fire line, they were witness to many attacks on civilians by both forces. Initially, they did attempt to publicize and verify the worst of these: the mass grave in Monoko-Zohi and the helicopter attacks on Menakro, for instance, were confirmed by French forces. They were later given a United Nations mandate to support the ECOWAS troops and protect civilians,206 but tended to interpret this fairly narrowly. For instance, they did distribute telephone numbers to civilians in Daloa, Duékoué and Guiglo, which they could use to call for help if needed, and Human Rights Watch was told of several cases where individuals were saved by French forces from acts of violence and even executions by government troops. However, in other instances, they did little to deter or prevent violence; placing troops around the Nicla refugee camp, for instance, might have had some effect in deterring the recruitment and militarization of that camp. French pressure brought both sides to the peace table at Linas-Marcoussis in late-January, and forged the accords, which gave human rights issues a prominent place. In an annexe, the Linas-Marcoussis accords tasked the new government of reconciliation with legislative reform of the laws on nationality, electoral procedure, and land inheritance, the immediate creation of a national human rights commission, the establishment of an international inquiry into serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law, and demanded an end to the impunity of those responsible for summary executions, in particular the death squads. While all of these steps are worthwhile, few if any of them have been initiated, and all will be necessary in order to try to bridge the deep divisions in Ivorian society. 204 Human Rights Watch interview with Guillaume Soro, Secretary- General of the MPCI, Bouaké, March 31, 2003. 205 This was one reason why Houphouet-Boigny did not build up the Ivoiran military. Another reason was that he mistrusted the potential threat to stability—and his own power—posed by a strong military. Given the history of military coups in the region, he was not short-sighted in that regard. 206 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1464, February 4, 2003. S/RES/1464/2003. Human Rights Watch 51 August 2003, Vol. 15, No. 14 (A)