2019 Statelessness & Citizenship Review 1(1) Some have argued that this lack of documentation has in fact resulted in ‘dire consequences that amount to de facto statelessness’. 24 David Weissbrodt and Clay Collins link de facto statelessness to lack of human rights protection and argue that it can occur either where the affected population is in situ (as in the case of the Nepali above) or where people move and ‘relinquish the services, protection and benefit of their country’. 25 The dilemma of the ‘traditional’ view, (that de facto statelessness occurs within a migratory context), as Caia Vlieks points out, is that there is a bias in recent de facto statelessness literature towards the in situ group at the expense of migrants. Vlieks’ argument is rooted in the idea that migrants are typically afforded less ‘benefit of the doubt’ in terms of substantiating their ties to a given state. 26 This understanding seeks to broaden the idea of de facto statelessness beyond individuals who are denied citizenship in their state of birth (in situ), by expanding upon the foundational concept of nationality and arguing that ties to place or state are important, and that they are subjective and fluctuate. These arguments for de facto statelessness are based on the idea that the quality and content of nationality (or citizenship) must be considered; that is, the issue is one of effective protection or nationality as stated above. 27 They implicitly undermine the view that nationality is solely an international law and formal concept as the 1954 Convention suggests. In broader nationality scholarship there is a view as Alison Kesby argues, that nationality is both a ‘territorial and legally constructed conception of place’ 28 which is ‘socially produced’. 29 Peter Spiro argues that the ‘traditional conception of international law and nationality is eroding’. 30 He suggests that a basic norm of non-discrimination should apply, which includes a procedural aspect; that is, ‘practices relating to birthright citizenship, naturalization, dual citizenship, and loss of citizenship’. 31 These arguments are particularly pertinent for our Vietnamese case study as we will explain in this article. Another point to note in this context, is that in comparison to the 1951 Convention which grants rights according to the level of attachment of an individual asylum seeker to the territory in which refuge is granted, 32 the 1954 Convention on stateless persons grants considerably more generous rights to stateless persons. This comparison corroborates Carol Batchelor’s argument that 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 The argument is that Nepal’s citizenship certificate is vital to everyday livelihood as it is related to the ability to access rights, opportunities and services afforded to Nepali citizens including formal sector employment, banking or micro-credit, birth and marriage registration and passports: Paul White, ‘Reducing de facto Statelessness in Nepal’ Forced Migration Review (Online, April 2009) 28 <https://www.fmreview.org/statelessness/white>. David Weissbrodt and Clay Collins, ‘The Human Rights of Stateless Persons’ (2006) 28(1) Human Rights Quarterly 245, 252. Caia Vlieks, ‘Contexts of Statelessness: The Concepts “Statelessness In Situ” and “Statelessness in the Migratory Context”’ in Tendayi Bloom, Katherine Tonkiss and Phillip Cole (eds), Understanding Statelessness (Taylor & Francis 2017) 35, 35. Batchelor (n 12) 233. Alison Kesby, The Right to Have Rights: Citizenship, Humanity and International Law (Oxford University Press 2012), 38. ibid 14. Peter J Spiro, ‘Citizenship, Nationality, and Statelessness’ in Vincent Chetail and Celine Bauloz (eds), Research Handbook on International Law and Migration (Edward Elgar 2014) 281, 281. ibid. Susan Kneebone, ‘The Pacific Plan: The Provision of “Effective Protection”?’ (2006) 18(3&4) International Journal of Refugee Law 696, 702–5. 74