Impact of gender equality norms on provisions of the 1961 Convention 13. The principle of gender equality enshrined in the ICCPR and CEDAW must be taken into account when interpreting the 1961 Convention. In particular, Article 9(2) of the CEDAW provides that women shall enjoy equal rights with men with respect to conferral of nationality on their children. 14. At the time of adoption of the 1961 Convention, prior to the adoption of the ICCPR (1966) and CEDAW (1979), many nationality laws discriminated on the basis of gender. The 1961 Convention acknowledges that statelessness can arise from conflicts of laws in cases of children born to parents of mixed nationalities, whether in or out of wedlock, on account of provisions in nationality laws that limit the right of women to transmit nationality. Article 1(3) of the 1961 Convention therefore establishes a safeguard requiring States to grant nationality to children who would otherwise be stateless and are born in their territory to mothers who are nationals. These children must acquire the nationality of their State of birth by operation of law immediately at birth. 15. Today, almost all Contracting States to the 1961 Convention have introduced gender equality in their nationality laws as prescribed by the ICCPR and CEDAW. The safeguard contained in Article 1(3) of the 1961 Convention, however, remains relevant in States where women are still treated less favourably than men in their ability to transmit nationality to their children. Although Article 1(3) of the 1961 Convention only addresses conferral of nationality by mothers, in light of the principle of equality set out in the ICCPR and CEDAW as well as other human rights treaties, children born in the territory of a Contracting State to fathers who are nationals are also to immediately acquire the nationality of that State at birth by operation 6 of law, if otherwise they would be stateless. II. WHEN WOULD AN INDIVIDUAL “OTHERWISE BE STATELESS” UNDER THE 1961 CONVENTION? a) Definition of “Stateless” under the 1961 Convention 16. Articles 1 and 4 of the 1961 Convention require States to grant their nationality to individuals who would otherwise be stateless. The 1961 Convention, however, does not define the term “stateless”. Rather, Article 1(1) of the 1954 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons (“1954 Convention”) establishes the international definition of a “stateless person” as a person “who is not considered as a national by any State under the 7 operation of its law”. This definition, according to the International Law Commission, is now part of customary international law. It is relevant for determining the scope of application of 8 the term “would otherwise be stateless” under the 1961 Convention. 9 17. The exclusion provisions set out in Article 1(2) of the 1954 Convention limit the scope of the obligations of States under that Convention. They are not relevant, however, for 6 This is relevant for those States which do not allow conferral of nationality by men to their children when born out of wedlock. Please see also the decision of the European Court of Human Rights of 11 October 2011 in the case of Genovese v. Malta, Application No. 53124/09. 7 For further details on the interpretation of Article 1(1) of the 1954 Convention please see UNHCR, Guidelines on the Definition of “Stateless Person” in Article 1(1) of the 1954 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons (“Definition Guidelines”), available at: http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4f4371b82.html and UNHCR, Guidelines on Procedures for Determining whether a Person is Stateless (“Procedures Guidelines”), available at: http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4f7dafb52.html 8 Please see International Law Commission, Articles on Diplomatic Protection with commentaries, 2006, 49, available at: http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/commentaries/9_8_2006.pdf. 9 Article 1(2) of the 1954 Convention states that the Convention shall not apply: (i) To persons who are at present receiving from organs or agencies of the United Nations other than the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees protection or assistance so long as they are receiving such protection or assistance; (ii) To persons who are recognized by the competent authorities of the country in which they have taken residence as having the rights and obligations which are attached to the possession of the nationality of that country; (iii) To persons with respect to whom there are serious reasons for considering that: (a) They have committed a crime against peace, a war crime, or a crime against humanity, as defined in the international instruments drawn up to make provisions in respect of such crimes; 4