GHOUMID AND OTHERS v. FRANCE JUDGMENT you as well. In this connection, I would strongly emphasise that it is the responsibility of the authorities, when they seek to expel an alien, even on grounds of absolute urgency, to ensure that the Court’s case-law is adhered to, and to ensure that the right of appeal is guaranteed, as well as the effectiveness of any such appeal. Lastly, with regard to the interference with personal identity, I am of the view that it can certainly be regarded as more detrimental for Mr Turk, Mr Ghoumid and Mr Charouali, the first two having been born in France and having acquired nationality by declaration when they reached the age of their majority, the third having become French at the age of 16 by the collective effect of his father’s naturalisation. But at the same time, I cannot but note that the allegiances revealed by the actions which justified their criminal convictions also demonstrate that their allegiance to France and its values has been of scant importance to them in the construction of their personal identity. In sum, therefore, I submit that the deprivation of nationality appears to be proportionate to the seriousness of the acts committed. I would add that there is nothing in the subsequent behaviour of the individuals concerned that would negate this assessment of the proportionality of the sanctions. ...” 16. The Conseil d’État dismissed the applicants’ actions to have the measures set aside in five similar decisions of 8 June 2016. It concluded that they could not validly claim that the orders appealed against had breached Article 4 of Protocol No. 7, which “was only applicable to criminal proceedings, [whereas] deprivation of nationality was an administrative sanction”. 17. It further found as follows: “... whilst, as regards the imposition of administrative sanctions, only acts constituting a breach of obligations defined by legislative or regulatory provisions in force at the time when these acts were committed are punishable, on the other hand, and save where otherwise provided, texts laying down the conditions for bringing proceedings and the forms of procedure apply immediately, even if they lead to the punishment of misconduct predating their entry into force; that it is the case for the texts setting the time-limits within which an administrative sanction can be issued, unless the previously applicable time-limits had already expired before they entered into force. ... in the present case, the most recent acts for which [the applicants were] convicted were committed in 2004. The Law of 23 January 2006 increased from ten to fifteen years the time-limit set in Article 25-1 of the Civil Code within which deprivation of nationality may be decided, from the time of commission of the acts giving rise to conviction for a serious offence constituting an act of terrorism. On the date of entry into force of this law, the previously applicable ten-year period within which the sanction of deprivation of nationality could be imposed on [the applicants] had not expired. As a result, the argument that by applying the time-limit provided for in Article 25-1 of the Civil Code, as amended by the Law of 23 January 2006, the impugned order[s] [were] based on inapplicable legislative provisions must be rejected; ... it is clear from the documents in the file that [the applicants were] convicted [and given the sentences set out in paragraph 9 above] for providing financial and logistical support to an organisation known as the ‘Moroccan Islamist Combatant Group’ (GICM), which was close to the ‘Salafiya Jihadia’ organisation, to which the 5