Sea Level Rise and Climate Statelessness investigate the possible added value of the law on statelessness, particularly the 1954 Convention, instead dismissing it for being ill-adapted to the task and for its applicability being contingent to the concerned LLIS losing its statehood shortly after becoming deterritorialised, an unlikely occurrence according to the dominant narrative. As a result, the assumed lack of relevance of the 1954 Convention rests upon the idea that it is effectively ‘too little, too late’. The present article aims to nuance this conclusion and introduce a contextsensitive approach to the relevance of the law on statelessness for EDPs from LLISs. In doing so, the current analysis is thus not aiming to provide a unique, better legal forecast but instead, to contribute to the better understanding of the various possible futures facing LLISs, and the solutions available in each respective future scenario. More precisely, the present article adopts a ‘worst-case scenario’ approach to evaluating the relevance of the law on stateless for EDPs from LLISs. Inherent to this hypothetical worst-case scenario is the assumption that preferred pre-emptive or palliative solutions such as bilateral or multilateral agreements could not be enacted, as they rely on the good will of other states, a currency that cannot be taken for granted, or relied upon in legal terms. A critical analysis of the arguments brought forward in the current literature also reveals that the statehood of a LLIS deprived of its territory and population cannot necessarily be relied upon, warranting the need for alternative solutions. As statehood would essentially be in the hands of the international community and rest upon the cumulative weight of what are ultimately political decisions, it may be premature to take deterritorialised statehood as a given. Were other states to interpret the boundaries of statehood restrictively, the protection afforded by the 1954 Convention would be triggered, providing a potentially valuable framework for EDPs to secure a legal status. Conversely, the added value of the legal framework on the protection of stateless persons may reside in the comparative situation of EDPs who would find themselves de facto stateless upon their cross-border migration, due to the continued existence of their state but ineffectiveness of their nationality. While afflicted by several shortcomings, the 1954 Convention nevertheless provides an established framework which could benefit EDPs in their host country. Furthermore, even for EDPs who would find themselves with an ineffective nationality, the protection afforded by the 1954 Convention could still provide valuable guidance for the receiving country. Increased visibility of the phenomenon of statelessness and positive trends towards ratification and implementation of the 1954 Convention could also positively benefit EDPs from LLISs if all other solutions were to fail. Ultimately, the added value of the 1954 Convention for EDPs would also depend on the benefits derived from their link with their respective deterritorialised LLISs. Exactly how much a deterritorialised state could do for its stranded nationals remains to be seen, but in the absence of precedents or binding frameworks, it may be useful to adopt a ‘hope for the best, plan for the worst’ approach. Reality is likely to prove much murkier than any neat legal forecast, which inevitably ends up relying on simplified scenarios. For instance, divided recognition could mean that the statehood of a deterritorialised LLIS regresses into the grey purgatory of quasi-states. Alternatively, it cannot be excluded that a LLIS could continue to exist as a sui generis entity, possessing international legal personality but falling short of detaining full statehood. 307