2021 Statelessness & Citizenship Review 3(2) problem for the UNHCR in engaging with state parties,50 but it is nevertheless relevant to any discussion on the implementation of the 1954 Convention. In summary, even if EDPs from LLISs were to qualify as stateless under the 1954 Convention upon the de jure extinction of their state of nationality, they would be (1) unlikely to be able to avail themselves of the protection provided by the 1954 Convention; and (2) even if they were, it is doubtful whether the protection would add anything worthwhile to that already provided by other international instruments. As a result, it is safe to say that the law on statelessness does not provide a ‘solution’ to protect EDPs from LLISs. This is the conclusion reached by most scholars who have discussed the issue thus far: ‘the Statelessness Conventions do not provide a ready solution to their plight’.51 McAdam frames the issue as such: ‘Accordingly, the statelessness treaties provide a very weak “solution” in the present context, which is already contingent on other factors’.52 While a fairly clear rebuttal to any attempt at framing statelessness as a possible ‘solution’, McAdam’s statement nevertheless leaves open the possibility that in some scenario(s), the law on statelessness could still play a role in the protection of EDPs. WORST-CASE SCENARIO Legal research, particularly that concerned with international law, is ill-equipped to project itself into the future. The sheer scope of possibilities deals a severe blow to any claim of certainty a fortiori once one takes into account the political nature of some of the deciding factors to be considered in order to reach any conclusion. Rather than to elaborate a complex analysis and present it as ‘the future’, it may thus be more practical to adopt a context-based approach to assess the multiplicity of legal futures. In doing so, one can hope to better identify the implicit assumptions necessary to prioritise one conclusion over another. Beyond the methodological value of this approach, it also benefits the overall value of the analysis it produces by ensuring that the preconditions for its relevance are discussed. This article is not an attempt to create a mutually exclusive alternative to previous research on the relevance of the law on statelessness in the context of climate change. Other analyses discussed are all likely to have added value to the common understanding of the future(s) LLISs may face. Instead of presenting a single timeline that relies upon a specific chain of events and legal interpretations as ‘the’ future, this article approaches legal analysis of the future as part of a broad spectrum consisting of multiple, possible parallel futures, with the eventual aim of discussing ‘a’ future. One could imagine this spectrum to range from ‘optimistic’ futures to more ‘pessimistic’ ones. At one end of the spectrum is a reversal in current environmental trends and the withdrawal of current threats to the existence 50 51 52 Mark Manly, ‘UNHCR’s Mandate and Activities to Address Statelessness’ in Alice Edwards and Laura van Waas (eds), Nationality and Statelessness under International Law (Cambridge University Press 2014) 88, 91. Alexander and Simon, ‘Sinking into Statelessness’ (n 17) 25. McAdam, ‘Forced Migration’ (n 6) 142. McAdam had earlier stated that ‘the instruments’ tight juridical focus leaves little scope for arguing for a broader interpretation that would encompass people whose State disappears’: see Jane McAdam and Ben Saul, ‘An Insecure Climate for Human Security? Climate-Induced Displacement and International Law’ (Research Paper No. 08/121, The University of Sydney, Sydney Law School, October 2008) 9. 296