Sea Level Rise and Climate Statelessness In short, the timeline supported by most authors locates the loss of statehood of a LLIS (if it ever occurs) much later than the loss of the state’s physical elements. 29 McAdam summarises the situation as follows: In light of the presumption of continuity of statehood, such recognition [that a State has ceased to exist], if forthcoming at all, would likely occur long after the population had moved. The application of the law on statelessness may have little practical benefit such a long time after the fact.30 B Too Little The other element that has weighed against the study of statelessness as a means of protection for EDPs from LLISs lies in its shortcomings as a protection framework. Not only would it apply long after EDPs would have had to leave their homes, but its actual added value would be so little as to be essentially worthless in practical terms. Firstly, based on the line of arguments discussed above, it is assumed that there would be a gap between the loss of physical indicia and the loss of statehood. During this period, EDPs would not qualify for the protection of the 1954 Convention, as they would still be considered as nationals of a state. However, while they would not qualify as de jure stateless under the 1954 Convention, EDPs would likely find themselves outside their own state’s jurisdiction and unable to avail themselves of its protection, rendering their nationality essentially ineffective.31 EDPs from deterritorialised LLISs would thus find themselves in the loose category of de facto stateless persons: formally nationals of a state, but unable to enjoy the different elements of nationality such as the possibility to return to their state of nationality.32 In contrast with de jure statelessness defined under the 1954 Convention, de facto statelessness has proven to be a contentious concept.33 A UNHCR background paper defines de facto stateless persons as follows: ‘persons 29 30 31 32 33 Several solutions have also been envisaged to secure continued statehood beyond the loss of territory, such as Burkett’s ‘nation ex situ’: Burkett (n 24) 346. See also Wong (n 26) 383– 89; Eleanor Doig, ‘What Possibilities and Obstacles Does International Law Present for Preserving the Sovereignty of Island States?’ (2016) 21 Tilburg Law Review 72. McAdam, ‘Forced Migration’ (n 6) 142. Park (n 12) 14. An interesting parallel could be drawn with persons temporarily stranded due to restrictions on travel in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic: see eg, Sandeep Singh, ‘Opinion: Indian Travel Ban Leaves Kiwis Stateless’, New Zealand Herald (online, 11 April 2021) <https://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/opinion-indian-travel-ban-leaves-kiwisstateless/ZNDHSAYCD53DG3UFUDVCLK455U/>. On the specific subject of the duty to readmit nationals see Heather Alexander and Jonathan Simon, ‘No Port, No Passport: Why Submerged States Can Have No Nationals’ (2017) 26(2) Washington International Law Journal 307, 316–19 (‘No Port, No Passport’). Jason Tucker, ‘Questioning De Facto Statelessness, by Looking at De Facto Citizenship’ (2014) 19(1–2) Tilburg Law Review 276. The distinction between de jure and de facto statelessness has also been criticised as being counterproductive in most contexts by Laura van Waas and situations of de facto statelessness are explicitly not addressed by the UNHCR’s handbook on statelessness: see Laura van Waas, ‘The UN Statelessness Conventions’ in Alice Edwards and Laura van Waas (eds), Nationality and Statelessness under International Law (Cambridge University Press 2014) 64, 80–81; Katia Bianchini, ‘Identifying the Stateless in Statelessness Determination Procedures and Immigration Detention in the United Kingdom’ (2020) 32(3) International Journal of Refugee Law 440; Handbook on Protection of Stateless Persons under the 1954 Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons (UNHCR 2014) 5 [7] (‘UNHCR Handbook’). 293