2021 Statelessness & Citizenship Review 3(2) of inadequate legal frameworks. The changes effected by climate change have steadily increased in scope and severity, with no sign of relenting.2 Climate change does not affect everyone equally. Citizens of low-lying island states (‘LLISs’) such as Tuvalu, Kiribati or the Maldives have known for some time that the existence of their country lies in the balance. Despite their infinitesimal contributions to the causal drivers of climate change, such vulnerable states are likely to be hit the hardest by the slow- and fast-onset effects of climate change. The increase in extreme weather events such as typhoons and king tides, coupled with the steady rise in sea levels, present well-documented threats to their very existence.3 Narratives taking for granted the loss of LLISs should be avoided, as they can undermine efforts to build local resilience and in situ adaptation. However, the reality of climate change is such that strategic planning is also needed to mitigate its impact on vulnerable populations, which presents a dilemma for the affected states in how they distribute their limited resources.4 Conversely, the predicament faced by LLIS also raises several novel questions about international law, in part due to the unprecedented possibility that an existing state could physically lose its entire territory. As statehood has traditionally been rooted in territorial sovereignty (or at least a claim to it), it is unclear if a deterritorialised LLIS would be able to retain its statehood beyond the loss of its territory, or if its entire territory becomes uninhabitable. Climate change thus poses a threat both to the physical and legal existence of the most vulnerable states. CLIMATE STATELESSNESS The possible physical disappearance of a state would also imply the cross-border migration of its nationals. While bilateral or multilateral agreements could secure a safe haven for the displaced populations, the lack of such a pre-emptive framework for relocation is particularly problematic in light of the lack of protection afforded by the current framework of refugee law. The definition of ‘refugee’ found in the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (‘1951 Convention’)5 centres the need for protection around the notion of persecution. As migration triggered by the rise of sea levels hardly involves a discriminatory intent or persecution on the grounds defined by the 1951 Convention, it is widely accepted that environmentally displaced persons (‘EDPs’) from LLISs that have been displaced exclusively due to environmental factors fall outside of the scope of international refugee law. This was examined at length in the 2014 New Zealand case of Teitiota v Chief Executive Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment, in which an I-Kiribati man unsuccessfully tried to claim protection 2 3 4 5 A recent example being the worrying slowdown of the gulf stream: see Levke Ceasar et al, ‘Current Atlantic Meridional Overturning Circulation Weakest in Last Millennium’ (2021) 14(3) Nature Geoscience 118. Curt D Storlazzi et al, ‘Most Atolls Will Be Uninhabitable by the Mid-21st Century Because of Sea-Level Rise Exacerbating Wave-Driven Flooding’ (2018) 4(4) Science Advances 1. Jonathon Barnett, ‘The Dilemmas of Normalising Losses from Climate Change: Towards Hope for Pacific Atoll Countries’ (2017) 58(1) Asia Pacific Viewpoint 3. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for signature 28 July 2951, 189 UNTS 37 (entered into force 22 April 1954) art 1(A) (‘1951 Convention’). 288