2021 Statelessness & Citizenship Review 3(2) of continuity as a ‘ratchet effect’, the principle can also be interpreted in the context of the dichotomy between the law of continuity and the law of state succession. This narrower understanding of continuity (ie that State A is the same entity that existed before Province X seceded from State A) instead centres its relevance on a dynamic assessment of identity. Thus framed, the presumption of continuity is restricted to a presumption against the creation of a new state where one already exists, essentially irrelevant to matters of statehood per se. Here, the unprecedented nature of the challenges faced by LLISs means that it remains unclear how the international community would understand the role and scope given to the presumption of continuity. Practically, whether the international community understands a ‘ratchet effect’ to be at work or not is likely to play a central role in confirming or disconfirming an LLIS’s claim to deterritorialised statehood. Until then, a definitive answer remains out of reach. The manner itself through which other states may need to express their respective opinions is also particularly challenging to assess as part of a legal analysis. Recognition by other states remains tantalisingly out of reach for those in search of a solid normative framework regulating accession to, and arguably loss of, statehood. Beyond the classical constitutive and declarative approaches, it remains particularly challenging to draw a line or draft a required number of acts of recognition that accommodates both the geopolitical realities and the normative framework that surrounds statehood. In the context of LLISs, it has been assumed that no other state would want to be the first to ‘derecognise’ a deterritorialised LLIS.67 McAdam further explains that for acts of ‘derecognition’ to bear legal weight, their cumulative weight should signify a general acceptance by the international community that the state in question has ceased to exist.68 This assumption, while sensible, remains at the level of political analysis. McAdam stops short of formulating an obligation to maintain recognition, and thus any claim that other states would not dare ‘unrecognise’ an LLIS is a political assessment, not a legal one. State practice in the case of Kosovo further highlights the fact that recognition is a matter left to the discretion of other states. As Tatjana Papić emphasises: There is no duty to recognize an entity fulfilling statehood requirements; for example, Iraq does not have to recognize Israel, and vice versa. This is an issue entirely left to states’ discretion. States should, likewise, be free to revoke recognition, as they were free to afford it in the first place. To think otherwise would presuppose that an act of recognition is a legal transaction, which it is not.69 The relevance of recognition also has to be considered together with its relative weight in assessing statehood. For instance, dismissing the need for physical indicia (ie territory, population) would result in making recognition effectively the sole constitutive element of statehood, an assumption that may not only face the usual criticism addressed at the constitutive doctrine of recognition, but also risks overstretching the (admittedly vague) boundaries of statehood.70 This simply highlights some of the risks involved in relying, directly or indirectly, on recognition as a definitive marker of statehood. 67 68 69 70 Kälin (n 12) 102. See also McAdam, ‘Forced Migration’ (n 6) 137. Crawford (n 26) 704, quoted in McAdam, ‘Forced Migration’ (n 6) 138. Tatjana Papić, ‘De-Recognition of States: The Case of Kosovo’ (2021) 53 (Winter) Cornell International Law Journal 683, 728–29. Alexander and Simon, ‘Sinking into Statelessness’ (n 17) 24. 300