26 Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its fifty-first session (c) “Successor State” means the State which has replaced another State on the occurrence of a succession of States; (d) “State concerned” means the predecessor State or the successor State, as the case may be; (e) “Third State” means any State other than the predecessor State or the successor State; (f) “Person concerned” means every individual who, on the date of the succession of States, had the nationality of the predecessor State and whose nationality may be affected by such succession; (g) “Date of the succession of States” means the date upon which the successor State replaced the predecessor State in the responsibility for the international relations of the territory to which the succession of States relates. Commentary (1) The definitions in subparagraphs (a), (b), (c), (e) and (g) are identical to the respective definitions contained in article 2 of the 1978 and 1983 Vienna Conventions. The Commission decided to leave these definitions unchanged so as to ensure consistency in the use of terminology in its work on questions relating to the succession of States.29 The definitions contained in subparagraphs (d) and (f) have been added by the Commission for the purposes of the present topic. (2) The term “succession of States”, as the Commission already explained at its twenty-sixth session in its commentary to this definition, is used “as referring exclusively to the fact of the replacement of one State by another in the responsibility for the international relations of territory, leaving aside any connotation of inheritance of rights or obligations on the occurrence of that event”.30 Unlike the previous work of the Commission relating to the succession of States, the present draft articles deal with the effects of such succession on the legal bond between a State and individuals. It is therefore to be noted that the said replacement of one State by another generally connotes replacement of one jurisdiction by another with respect to the population of the territory in question, which is of primary importance for the present topic. (3) The meanings attributed to the terms “predecessor State”, “successor State” and “date of the succession of States” are merely consequential upon the meaning given to “succession of States”. It must be observed that, in some cases of succession, such as transfer of territory or separation of part of the territory, the predecessor State is not replaced in its entirety by the successor State, but only in respect of the territory affected by the succession. 29 See also the earlier position of the Commission on this point. Yearbook . . . 1981, vol. II (Part Two), p. 22, document A/36/10, paragraph (4) of the commentary to article 2 of the draft articles on succession of States in respect of State property, archives and debts. 30 Yearbook . . . 1974, vol. II (Part One), p. 175, document A/9610/ Rev.1, paragraph (3) of the commentary to article 2 of the draft articles on succession of States in respect of treaties. (4) Subparagraph (d) provides the definition of the term “State concerned”, by which, depending on the type of the territorial change, are meant the States involved in a particular case of “succession of States”. These are the predecessor State and the successor State in the case of a transfer of part of the territory (art. 20), the successor State alone in the case of a unification of States (art. 21), two or more successor States in the case of a dissolution of a State (arts. 22 and 23) and the predecessor State and one or more successor States in the case of a separation of part of the territory (arts. 24 to 26). The term “State concerned” has nothing to do with the “concern” that any other State might have about the outcome of a succession of States in which its own territory is not involved. (5) Subparagraph (f) provides the definition of the term “person concerned”. The Commission considers it necessary to include such a definition, since the inhabitants of the territory affected by the succession of States may include, in addition to the nationals of the predecessor State, nationals of third States and stateless persons residing in that territory on the date of the succession. (6) It is generally recognized, that Persons habitually resident in the absorbed territory who are nationals of [third] States and at the same time not nationals of the predecessor State cannot be invested with the successor’s nationality. On the other hand . . . [t]here is an “inchoate right” on the part of any State to naturalize stateless persons resident upon its territory.31 Nevertheless, even the status of the latter category of persons is different from that of the persons who were the nationals of the predecessor State on the date of the succession. (7) Accordingly, the term “person concerned” includes neither persons who are only nationals of third States nor stateless persons who were present on the territory of any of the “States concerned”. It encompasses only individuals who, on the date of the succession of States, had the nationality of the predecessor State and whose nationality may thus be affected by that particular succession of States. By “persons whose nationality may be affected”, the Commission means all individuals who could potentially lose the nationality of the predecessor State or, respectively, acquire the nationality of the successor State, depending on the type of succession of States. (8) Determining the category of individuals affected by the loss of the nationality of the predecessor State is easy in the event of total succession, when the predecessor State or States disappear as a result of the change of sovereignty (unification of States, dissolution of a State): all individuals having the nationality of the predecessor State lose this nationality as an automatic consequence of that State’s disappearance. But determining the category of individuals susceptible of losing the predecessor State’s nationality is quite complex in the case of partial succes31 O’Connell, The Law of State . . . (footnote 24 above), pp. 257-258. Similarly, it was held in Rene Masson v. Mexico that the change of sovereignty affects only nationals of the predecessor State, while the nationality of other persons residing in the territory at the time of the transfer is not affected. See J. B. Moore, History and Digest of the International Arbitrations to which the United States has been a Party (Washington D.C., United States Government Printing Office, 1898), vol. III, pp. 2542-2543.