PART TWO THE INTERPRETATION OF THE CONVENTION Article 1 Definition of the term “stateless person” 1. For the purpose of this Convention, the term “stateless person” means a person who is not considered as a national by any State under the operation of its law. 2. This Convention shall not apply: (i) To persons who are at present receiving from organs or agencies of the United Nations other than the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees protection or assistance so long as they are receiving such protection or assistance. (ii) To persons who are recognized by the competent authorities of the country in which they have taken residence as having the rights and obligations which are attached to the possession of the nationality of that country; (iii) To persons with respect to whom there are serious reasons for considering that: (a) They have committed a crime against peace, a war crime, or a crime against humanity, as defined in the international instruments drawn up to make provisions in respect of such crimes; (b) They have committed a serious non-political crime outside the country of their residence prior to their admission to that country; (c) They have been guilty of acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations. 1. This Article 1s quite simple in its wording but raises a number of problems. One of them is the relation between this Convention and the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. Formally, this Convention completely ignores the Refugee Convention, i.e., it does not contain either references thereto or a provision delimiting the application of both instruments. The necessity of a delimitation may appear to arise from the circumstance that the Refugee Convention, while formally dealing with “refugees” as defined in its Article 1, treats in practice largely of stateless persons because many of the refugees do not possess a nationality. It is therefore probable that, if one and the same state adheres to both Conventions, one and the same person would fall under both of them. It is true that the difference between the two Conventions regarding their substantive provisions is not very great, but nonetheless the present Convention omitted certain provisions of the Refugee Convention and amended a few others. It is also true that, by restricting its application as a rule to de jure stateless persons, the possibility of double application was to a certain extent reduced. But the probability of one and the same person being eligible under both Conventions remains. In law and in fact, however, this would create no difficulty: if one and the same person qualifies as a “refugee” (under the terms of the Refugee Convention) and as a “stateless person” (in accordance with this Convention) the state must apply to him (or her) the more favourable provisions of the Refugee Convention. This follows from the purpose of the Stateless Persons Convention to cover such persons to whom the Refugee Convention is not applicable. The maxim of lex posterior is not applicable here because the two conventions are not consecutive but parallel instruments. Therefore the circumstance that this Convention came into force subsequently to the Refugee Convention would not justify the application of its more restrictive provisions to a person who is eligible under the Refugee Convention to broader rights, just because the “refugee” is at the same time also a “stateless person”. The same rule should also apply to countries which ratified the 1932 or 1938 Conventions but have not adhered to the Refugee Convention and will accede to this Convention.