4. Under its first sentence, Article 8 does not preclude the application of exceptional measures to stateless persons, it only prohibits (within the limitation of the second sentence) their application to a stateless person 14 solely on account of his having previously possessed the nationality ...... In other words, a state is free to apply to a stateless person exceptional measures if they are taken on grounds other than his former nationality. Thus Article 8, sentence one, would not hinder the application of exceptional measures on account of the economic or political activity or special unwanted contacts of a stateless person, if such activity or contacts are, in general, a reason for applying all or some of the exceptional measures. The first sentence as it stands, is applicable to “ stateless persons” only who meet the test of Article 1, i.e., have no nationality. As we have seen, however, de facto stateless persons (persons who have a nationality) may also be granted the status of a “stateless person” under the Convention. Since the recommendation does not provide for derogations from this status, it must be assumed that they would also benefit from the provisions of Article 8, despite its wording. The second sentence which was taken over from the Refugee Convention makes an exception in favour of states which, “under their legislation, are prevented from applying” the first sentence. In accordance with accepted practices, international conventions take precedence over national legislation. Therefore, the existence of legislation to which the second sentence refers could not legally justify a narrower application of the contractual rule, if the second sentence were not included. It is obvious that the sentence was included in order to “appease” states which are not or would not be willing to accept the general rule 92 93 94 as expressed in the first sentence. The exception was based on a Swedish and British amendment to the draft of the Refugee Convention which differed in their aims: the Swedish desired to permit states whose legislation leaves it to the government to decide 95 what measures should apply to whom, to continue doing so; the British amendment was concerned with assets belonging to nationals of satellite countries who might become refugees, but who, during the war, were collaborators of the enemy régime. The inclusion of the second sentence of Article 8 in the Refugee Convention was based on the assumption of some representatives that no government would be willing to amend its national legislation in a field in which national security might conceivably be at stake and that, since Article 8 was subject to reservations, it was in the interest of refugees that it should be cast in a form which was acceptable to governments, thus inducing them to accept at least certain commitments should they not be in a position to subscribe to the 96 general principle. The same is obviously true of the present Convention. 5. There will undoubtedly be states which are parties both to this Convention and the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War. Unless they enter a reservation to Article 44 of the latter Convention, they will have to adhere to it regardless of the limitation permitted under this Convention, although the present Convention is a later act, because the parties to the Geneva Convention may be different from the Contracting States of this Convention. This would not hinder any state from applying the second sentence of Article 8 in cases not covered by the Geneva Convention, although it is rather difficult to find a logical application for the lesser liberality in less threatening situations. 92 The Canadian representative in the Refugee Convention not incorrectly characterized Article 8 by saying that what the article gave with one hand, it took away with the other (SR.34, p. 22). 93 A/CONF.2/37. 94 A/CONF.2/83. 95 Article 8 uses the word "legislation" (not "legislative system") to denote that the second sentence is applicable to countries where the national laws preclude the application of the principle established in the first sentence; it is not necessary that its application be excluded on the basis of the country's national system of legislation (SR.35, p. 4, of the Refugee Conference). 96 SR.34, pp. 22-23. The French representative stated clearly that "there was no doubt that the general principle would not be observed by countries in case of national emergency, such as war" (ibid., p. 21). There was a strong opposition in the Conference to this restriction (SR.34, pp. 18 ff), but the restrictive view prevailed.