International Journal of Refugee Law, 2026, Vol. 00, Issue 00 • 13 3.3. Obligations in respect of a particular nationality In international law, States have historically been reluctant to commit to grant their own nationality to those who would otherwise be stateless, preferring instead to codify an abstract right to a nationality. This has led to a perception that individual claims to a nationality are not able to be enforced against any particular state.103 However, this perception may be weakening; there seems to be growing recognition that an obligation to grant nationality falls first and most heavily upon the country with which a person is most closely connected.104 This idea derives from a combination of the legal concepts of one’s ‘own country’, ‘a genuine connection’, and ‘effective nationality’. International law protects rights in relation to one’s ‘own country’. Article 13(2) of the UDHR provides that ‘[e]veryone has the right to … return to his country’ while article 12(4) of the ICCPR states that ‘[n]o one shall be arbitrarily deprived of the right to enter his own country’. The Human Rights Committee has explained that this use of the term ‘own country’ suggests that a person can have a special relationship with, and be owed rights by, a country which may not officially recognize them as a national but to which they nevertheless have ‘special ties to or claims in relation to’.105 The Committee acknowledges this relationship arises in cases of ‘long term residents, including…stateless persons arbitrarily deprived of the right to acquire the nationality of the country of such residence’.106 In the context of an individual communication concerning deportation, the Committee elaborated on the factors ‘other than nationality which may establish close and enduring connections between a person and a country’,107 including the period of residence in the country, personal and family ties, the intention to remain, and the lack of ties to other countries.108 The phrase one’s ‘own country’ has particular resonance in the context of statelessness. The UNHCR’s use of the phrase ‘own country’ to describe in situ stateless populations draws directly from the use of this phrase in article 12(4) of the ICCPR and its interpretation by the Human Rights Committee. It seems evident, then, that in situ stateless people have a right to the nationality of their ‘own country’: the country with which they are most closely associated.109 For the UAE’s bidun population, this is clearly the UAE and not the Comoros. Foster and Lambert (n 97) 574. See, eg Manby (n 98). 105 Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 27: Article 12 (Freedom of Movement) (UN Doc CCPR/C/21/Rev1/Add9 (2 November 1999)) [20]. 106 ibid. 107 Human Rights Committee, ‘Views: Communication No. 1557/2007 (Stefan Lars Nystrom v. Australia)’ UN Doc CCPR/C/102/D/1557/2007 (18 July 2011) [7.4]. 108 ibid. 109 David S Weissbrodt, The Human Rights of Non-Citizens (Oxford University Press 2008) 108. 103 104 Downloaded from academic.oup.com/ijrl/advance-article/doi/10.1093/ijrl/eeag028/8767365 by guest on 08 October 2026 nationality, and, additionally under the ICERD, to avoid depriving the bidun of nationality on discriminatory and arbitrary grounds. These obligations are strengthened in respect of the bidun population, given they are both stateless and habitually resident on the state’s territory. In response, the UAE may contend that the arrangement with the Comoros gave effect to the right of the bidun populations to a nationality. However, as the 1954 Convention and the European Convention on Nationality make clear, it is a State’s own nationality that should be provided to in situ stateless populations. The next section further develops the argument that it is not any nationality can be supplied in satisfaction of States’ obligations in respect of nationality, but the nationality to which the population is connected.