Citizenship Stripping in Myanmar as Lawfare
the Union of Myanmar (‘NUG’) pledged that the 1982 Law would be repealed
with the success of the Spring Revolution and the removal of the SAC.6
In this commentary, I contextualise the three orders of denationalisation against
the backdrop of the ongoing Spring Revolution against the military junta and the
latter’s brutal suppression of the former. I argue that the SAC only impulsively
and arbitrarily used citizenship stripping or revocation as part of its package of
warfare against the revolution.
THE 1982 LAW AND THE PROVISION FOR DENATIONALISATION
The 1982 Law was originally written during the rule of the xenophobic Burma
Socialist Programme Party regime (1974–88). The law divides Myanmar citizenry
into a ‘native’ component, capturing those who had settled in the country before
British colonisation (prior to 1823), and a non-native, immigrant component,
concerning those who migrated to colonial Burma, where they later settled
permanently. By according different rights to two classes of citizens, the law
effectively elevates the status of citizens of ‘native’ ancestry above the status of
citizens of immigrant ancestry.7
Why did the SAC use the pro-native 1982 Law, and s 16 in particular, in
suppressing alleged ‘terrorism’ against its rule? The short answer is because this
section contains the only provision in the Myanmar legal corpus that permits
denationalisation of citizens. Myanmar citizenship may only be revoked under one
of two conditions: where the individual leaves Myanmar permanently and/or
where the individual acquires citizenship and identity documentation, such as a
national ID or passport, of a foreign country. 8 The three SAC orders of
denationalisation stated that all of the 33 people left Myanmar, thus satisfying the
condition as required in the 1982 Law.
The 1982 Law was in effect when dissidents, activists and politicians fled
Myanmar in search of refuge in neighbouring countries9 after the military took
power in September 1988 in the aftermath of popular protests against the oneparty socialist regime. Although, while in power, the military junta used a variety
of tools to repress the opposition, they never used the denationalisation provision
in the 1982 Law.10 The military’s decision in March and April 2022 is therefore
unprecedented. This, however, was not the first attempt to denationalise or deprive
Myanmar Spring revolutionaries and opposition politicians of Myanmar identity
documentation. In 2021, the Embassy of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar,
6
See
eg,
Zin
Mar
Aung
(Facebook,
5
March
2022)
<https://www.facebook.com/100011819040715/posts/1239702309767059/>, archived at
<https://perma.cc/P8Y6-K74H>;
Wai
Mar
Tun,
‘နင
ို င
် သ
ံ ားအဖြစ်ရပ်စမ
ဲ ှု
လအခွငအ
် ကရားချ ားကြ
7
8
9
10
်ရ ကရ
်က
င်ား ကေြန် [Critics: Denationalisation is Human Rights
Violation]’, Radio Free Asia (Burmese) (Blog Post, 7 March 2022) <https://www.rfa.org/
burmese/program_2/myanmar-citizenship-law03072022164332.html>,
archived
at
<https://perma.cc/2QMN-3QXB>; Ministry of Justice (Facebook, 4 April 2022)
<https://www.facebook.com/107793768252630/posts/173910538307619/>, archived at
<https://perma.cc/J2BP-4264>.
Nyi Nyi Kyaw, ‘Alienation, Discrimination, and Securitization: Legal Personhood and
Cultural Personhood of Muslims in Myanmar’ (2015) 13(4) Review of Faith & International
Affairs 50.
Burma Citizenship Law 1982, s 16 (Burma).
Bertil Lintner, Outrage: Burma’s Struggle for Democracy (Review Publishing Company,
1989) 196–215.
Wai Mar Tun (n 6).
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