34. Further, while Decree No 13 is a welcome acknowledgement of the historic injustice against stateless Kurds, additional steps would be required to comprehensively address the legacy of Kurdish statelessness resulting from inter-generational deprivation since 1962.54 It is important that the legacy of the 1962 be meaningfully integrated into the ongoing transitional justice processes within Syria, with consideration given to the topics of truth-seeking, reparations as well as guarantees of non-recurrence. Affected community members have raised the issue of redress for historic deprivations of Housing, Land and Property rights violations emanating from their statelessness. Additionally, education remains a pressing concern for many (formerly) stateless Kurds of Syria, both in terms of compensating for missed opportunities, and obtaining accreditation for studies undertaken. Palestinian Population 35. The Syrian Government has historically excluded Palestinians from the right to acquire Syrian Nationality, a policy framed as grounded in concerns about the impact naturalisation could have on the Palestinian right of return. The 1965 Casablanca Protocol affirmed that Palestinians should be entitled to certain rights with those on par with citizens in host Arab states, without undermining their Palestinian identity and right of return. Its text does not itself bar host states from granting nationality, it only requires that Palestinian nationality is preserved, leaving room for dual nationality. However, many Arab host countries, including Syria, have treated naturalization of Palestinians and the granting of citizenship to those of Palestinian descent as incompatible with the right to return, using this rationale to justify blanket exclusion of Palestinians from citizenship, a policy choice with no textual basis in the Protocol itself.55 36. According to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), there were 560,000 Palestinian refugees from Syria registered with UNRWA prior to the outbreak of the Syrian civil war. In 2025, 438,000 remain, of whom 40% are internally displaced.56 Those who fled the conflict in Syria were not allowed to cross into Lebanon and Jordan.57 As a result, large numbers have been left in prolonged legal limbo, both within Syria and in host countries where access to residency, documentation, and basic rights remains limited. 37. Prior to 2011, there were 12 Palestinian camps in Syria: 9 administered by UNRWA and 3 considered ‘unofficial’. Yarmouk camp, the largest Palestinian camp in Syria, was home to roughly 160,000 Palestinian refugees before the war. Following air strikes on Yarmouk in 2012, around 90% of the Palestinians living there were forced to leave their homes and houses, an event reminiscent of the Nakba in 1948. The camp was destroyed and became an uninhabitable area.58 Since late 2020, Palestinian Refugees and other former residents have started to gradually return to Yarmouk. Following the fall of Syria’s previous regime in late 2024, this number significantly increased, 54 Thomas McGee, Interim Syrian Government and the Legacy of Kurdish Statelessness – Finally Resolution and Justice?, Global Citizenship Observatory, European University Institute (13 April 2026). 55 https://www.statelesshub.org/country/palestine 56 https://www.unrwa.org/sites/default/files/content/resources/unrwa_2025_syria_lebanon_and_jordan_emerge ncy_appeal_f.pdf 57 https://www.refworld.org/reference/countryrep/unhcr/2017/en/120679 58 https://files.institutesi.org/UPR40_Syria.pdf 11