that many non-Syrian Kurds had crossed illegally from Turkey”.37 Due to the intergenerational nature of statelessness, the number of stateless Kurds had multiplied, with UNHCR citing a figure of 300,000 stateless Kurds in its reporting from 2004 to 2011.38 Other sources have reported the figure of stateless Kurds in 2011 as high as 517,000.39 29. Stateless Kurds in Syria were divided into two groups after the 1962 census. Those who attended the 1962 census but failed to satisfy the authorities that they were resident in Syria prior to 1945 were considered ‘Ajanib’ (literally meaning ‘foreigners’).40 This population faced restrictions in terms of access to public services and limited rights of ownership, inheritance and education, amongst others. A second group, the ‘maktumeen’ (roughly translated as the ‘concealed’ ones) were those whose details were not at all recorded by the census officials. They have even fewer rights than the Ajanib and are unable to legally travel within Syria without special security permission.41 Statelessness was reproduced across subsequent generations with offspring born to non-recognised marriages involving stateless Kurds also being considered maktumeen. 30. Following decades of mobilisation among Kurdish activists and human rights actors calling for these individuals to be able to access Syrian citizenship, Decree No 49 of April 2011 was a welcome move to permit the granting of citizenship to some stateless Kurds. However, the Decree made no acknowledgement of the historical injustices, suffering, and rights deprivations experienced across generations. It was seen as granting citizenship as a concession rather than in recognition of the rights and entitlements of those naturalized. Indeed, official Syrian government discourse has been silent on this issue. Additionally, in terms of inclusion within society, many ethnic Kurds continue to resent the fact that Syrian citizens are officially defined as ‘Syrian Arab citizens’. Civil society activists have raised the question of dropping the term ‘Arab’ from the citizenship and the name of the state to more accurately reflect Syria’s ethnically diverse demography.42 31. Moreover, the naturalization process emanating from Decree No 49 only mentioned Ajanib in Hassakeh, thereby providing no direct right to citizenship for the Maktumeen. Anjanib who had left Syria were also unable to benefit from the Decree’s provisions without returning to Syria, which was often not practically possible. 43 Further, stringent requirements mean that many Ajanib even within 37 Institute on Statelessness and Inclusion and European Network on Statelessness, “From Syria to Europe: Experiences of Stateless Kurds and Palestinian Refugees from Syria Seeking Protection in Europe,” January 2019, at 9, available at: http://www.institutesi.org/from_Syria_to_Europe.pdf. 38 See entry for the Syrian Arab Republic within UNHCR’s Refugee Population Statistics Mobile App. 39 Syrians for Truth and Justice, “Syrian Citizenship Disappeared: How the 1962 Census destroyed stateless Kurds’ lives and identities,” 15 September 2018, available at: https://stj-sy.org/en/745/. 40 Thomas McGee, “The Stateless Kurds of Syria: Ethnic Identity and National I.D.”, Tilburg Law Review, Vol. 19, Issue 1-2, pages 171 – 181. 41 Institute on Statelessness and Inclusion and European Network on Statelessness, “From Syria to Europe: Experiences of Stateless Kurds and Palestinian Refugees from Syria Seeking Protection in Europe,” January 2019, available at: http://www.institutesi.org/from_Syria_to_Europe.pdf. 42 Hamed Mohammad Saffour, Dr. Rim Turkmani & Mazen Gharibah, “An Analysis of Commonalities and Divergences of Syrian Constitutional Papers Since 2011,” Conflict Research Programme, 26 October 2019, available at: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/102253/5/Turkmani_an_analysis_of_commonalities_and_divergences_published_English. pdf. 43 Thomas McGee, “Statelessness Displaced: Update on Syria’s Stateless Kurds,” Statelessness Working Paper Series No. 2016/02, 2016, available at: https://files.institutesi.org/WP2016_02.pdf. 9