the State of nationality is one in which the individual was neither born nor habitually resides. The relevant criterion is whether the State in question considers a person to be its national. 11. A State may have two or more categories of “national” not all necessarily enjoying the same rights. For the purposes of the definition in Article 1(1), these persons would still be regarded as nationals of the State and therefore not stateless. 12. Whether an individual actually is a national of a State under the operation of its law requires an assessment of the viewpoint of that State. This does not mean that the State must be asked in all cases for its views about whether the individual is its national in the context of statelessness determination procedures. 13. Rather, in assessing the State’s view it is necessary to identify which of its authorities are competent to establish/confirm nationality for the purposes of Article 1(1). This should be assessed on the basis of national law as well as practice in that State. In this context, a broad reading of “law” is justified, including for example customary rules and practices. 14. If, after having examined the nationality legislation and practice of States with which an individual enjoys a relevant link (in particular by birth on the territory, descent, marriage or habitual residence) – and/or after having checked as appropriate with those States – the individual concerned is not found to have the nationality of any of those States, then he or she should be considered to satisfy the definition of a stateless person in Article 1 (1) of the 1954 Statelessness Convention.1 15. “Under the operation of its law” should not be confused with “by operation of law”, a term which refers to automatic (ex lege) acquisition of nationality2. Thus, in interpreting the term “under the operation of its law” in Article 1(1), consideration has to be given to non-automatic as well as automatic methods of acquiring and being deprived of nationality. 16. The Article 1(1) definition employs the present tense (“who is…”) and so the test is whether a person is considered as a national at the time the case is examined and not whether he or she might be able to acquire the nationality in the future. 17. In the case of non-automatic modes of acquisition, a person should not be treated as a “national” where the mechanism of acquisition has not been completed. 18. The ordinary meaning of Article 1(1) requires that a “stateless person” is a person who is not considered a national by a State regardless of the background to this situation. Thus, where a deprivation of nationality may be contrary to rules of international law, this illegality is not relevant in determining whether the person is a national for the purposes of Article 1(1) – rather, it is the position under domestic law that is relevant. The alternative approach would lead to outcomes contrary to the ordinary meaning of the terms of Article 1(1) interpreted in light of the Convention’s object and purpose. This does not, however, prejudice any obligation that States may have not to recognize such situations as legal where the illegality relates to a violation of jus cogens norms.3 1 2 3 Foundlings are an exception. In the absence of proof to the contrary, foundlings should be presumed to have the nationality of the State in whose territory they are found as set out in Article 2 of the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness. See, for example, 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, Articles 1, 4 and 12. A jus cogens norm (or a peremptory norm of general international law) is a rule of customary international law which cannot be set aside by treaty or acquiescence but only by the formation of a subsequent customary rule of contrary effect. Examples of such norms are the prohibition on the use of Small Changes ‫ ـ‬Big Gains: An Action Plan to Prevent and Reduce Statelessness in the Kyrgyz Republic 83