need, in line with international standards, but rather on group distinctions. A disproportionate amount of aid activities are dedicated to government–recognized refugees, even though they constitute only about 10 percent of the population in need of aid. While refugees in the official camps face their own protection gaps, their living conditions and opportunities are distinctly better than those of the UMN. Refugees in the official camps have more educational opportunities and better protection, including official identity cards to help avoid arrest and exploitation. They also benefit from the presence of police and UNHCR protection officers in their camps. Likewise, children in the refugee camps have access to learning centers up to the eighth grade, while UMN have more limited opportunities, going only until the fifth grade. Flawed Initial Response The influx of 74,000 new Rohingya into Bangladesh starting in October 2016 exposed the extent of inadequacy in the humanitarian coordination structure and the consequences of the prevailing political fears around “pull factors.” As one humanitarian worker told RI, “The status quo had endured so long that the level of dysfunction was not apparent until the crisis hit.” At the start of the October 2016 crisis, the Government of Bangladesh kept the border closed, and border guards actively intercepted boats carrying Rohingya refugees, violating the international principle of non-refoulement by pushing back more than 5,000 Rohingya to Myanmar between October 2016 and January 2017.5 Appeals by the international community, including by UNHCR and human rights groups, to open the borders were ignored.6 International humanitarian agencies and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) were unable to provide help to those Rohingya who did manage to arrive, forced instead to await official permission to extend much needed emergency humanitarian aid. UNHCR was not permitted to play the role it does in other refugee crises, such as registering new arrivals and identifying the greatest needs and most vulnerable. As a result, new arrivals made their own way to disparate locations, making an adequate needs assessment impossible. In the absence of a formal response, initial food and shelter needs were met in an ad hoc manner, with Rohingya already in the country and the local Bangladeshi host communities acting as the first line of response. Many new arrivals found their way to family members or former neighbors already living in official camps or makeshift sites. This put an obvious strain on already limited living space and resources. Even before the crisis, the region faced great strains. Just before October 2016, IOM’s director of emergency operations visited Bangladesh and observed, “The humanitarian situation here is fragile, and is not getting the global attention it requires…Tens of thousands of people are at risk of malnutrition, disease and violence, due to the insufficient water and sanitation facilities and the overall vulnerability of the displaced community.”7 As a result of the new influx, food distribution and water and sanitation systems were overwhelmed, leading to a doubling of cases of malnutrition and the spread of communicable diseases, including outbreaks of measles 7 www.refugeesinternational.org